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AALTO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS  ABSTRACT  
Research on Accounting                               May 11, 2010  
Janne Björklund  
  
  
PRIVATE COMPANY DISCOUNTS IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Evidence from 
U.S.A 
  
Purpose of the thesis 
  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether privately held companies are on 
average sold at a discount compared to publicly traded peer companies, and whether 
the possible discounts can be explained by factors related to company size, 
performance, industry it operates or acquisition time.  
 
Data  
  
The research sample consists of U.S. based acquisitions between the years 1989 and 
2008. The initial sample consists 23,872 companies, from which is sorted the final 
sample of 242 companies. The final sample consists 121 acquisition pairs of where 
the acquisitions have similar characters. 
  
Research Methods    
  
The research design involves calculating four valuation multiples for each 
acquisition in order to determine valuation differences and the possible private 
company discount. Further on these valuation differences are studied with multiples 
regression models that include variables related to company’s status, size, 
performance, industry, and acquisition time. 
 
Results 
  
The results suggest that privately held companies, on average, are sold at a lower 
price compared to publicly traded peer companies. Company’s Net assets, Net debt 
and acquisition time can partly explain these transaction price differences. 
  
Keywords  
   
Valuation, private company discount, mergers & acquisitions, marketability, 
multiples 
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Janne Björklund  
  
  
PÖRSSILISTAAMATTOMIEN YRITYSTEN ARVOSTUS VERRATTUNA 
PÖRSSILISTATTUIHIN YRITYKSIIN YRITYSKAUPPATILANTEISSA 
Aineistona Yhdysvaltalaiset yrityskaupat 
  
Tutkimuksen tavoite 
  
Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää arvostetaanko pörssilistaamattomat 
yksityiset yritykset samaan arvoon verrattuna vastaavanlaisiin pörssilistattuihin 
yrityksiin yrityskauppahetkellä. Lisäksi tavoitteena on selvittää voidaanko arvostuseroja 
selittää yrityksen listautumattomuuteen, kokoon, kannattavuuteen, toimialaan, tai 
yrityskaupan ajankohtaan liittyvillä tekijöillä. 
 
Aineisto  
  
Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu Yhdysvalloissa toteutuneista yrityskaupoista vuosien 
1989 ja 2008 välillä. Aineisto käsittää yhteensä 23872 yritystä, joista erotetaan 242:n 
yrityksen otos. Tämä lopullinen otos käsittää 121 yrityskauppa-paria jossa toisena 
osapuolena on yksityinen yritys ja toisena julkinen yritys. Nämä yrityskaupat ovat 
luonteeltaan mahdollisimman samanlaisia. 
  
Tutkimusmenetelmät    
  
Tutkimuksen aluksi lasketaan neljä eri tunnuslukua, taseen ja tuloslaskelman pohjalta, 
jokaiselle yrityskaupalle sekä lisäksi keskiarvo ja mediaani tulokset yksityisille sekä 
julkisille transaktioille. Tämän jälkeen yksityisten yritysten keskiarvo ja mediaani 
tunnuslukuja verrataan julkisten yritysten vastaaviin, arvostuserojen saavuttamiseksi 
sekä yksityisten yritysten hinnanalennuksen selvittämiseksi. Tämän jälkeen 
mahdollisesti ilmennyttä hinnanalennusta tutkitaan regressiomallien avulla. 
Hinnanalennusta pyritään selittämään yrityksen listautumattomuudella, koolla, 
kannattavuudella, toimialalla, ja/tai yrityskaupan ajankohdalla. 
 
Tulokset 
  
Tulosten perusteella voidaan todeta, että Yhdysvaltalaiset pörssilistaamattomat yritykset 
keskiarvollisesti myydään alennettuun hintaan verrattuna vastaavanlaisiin 
pörssilistattuihin yrityksiin. Yritysten arvostuseroja voidaan osittain selittää yrityksen 
nettovarallisuudella, nettovelalla sekä yrityskaupan ajankohdalla. 
  
Avainsanat 
Arvonmääritys, yrityskauppa, markkinakelpoisuus, hinnoittelukerroin 
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TERMINOLOGY 
 
APV  = Adjusted Present Value 
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CEO = Chief Executive Officer 
CFE  = Cash Flow to Equity 
DCF = Discounted Cash Flow 
DLOC = Discount for Lack of Control 
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EBIT = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
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ECM = Economic Component Model 
FCFF = Free Cash Flow to Firm 
FMV = Fair Market Value 
IPO = Initial Public Offering 
LTM = Last Twelve Months 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE 
 
In everyday life we often face the question: What is the value of a particular asset to me? Whether 
the  asset  is  the  amount  of  leisure-time  with  your  loved  ones  or  a  family  business,  the  problem  
remains same. How do we define the true value? 
 
 The valuation of companies is one of the most studied topics among the area of finance and 
accounting. Therefore finance and accounting literature offers numerous amounts of theories for 
analysts  and  management  to  help  among  the  valuation  process.  One  of  the  most  widely  used  
approaches is the discounted cash flow method. However this method contains parameters that can 
only be one’s best estimations of future success, such as projections of interest rates, growth rate, 
capital structure and timing of cash flows. These values are often difficult to predict for public 
companies and even far more difficult to estimate for private companies. Therefore to put a price 
tag on a company is not that easy and the valuation process itself often takes months of job. 
  
When it comes to valuation of privately held companies, it gets even more difficult than with public 
ones and usually represents subjective characteristics. Unlike publicly traded companies, a private 
company has no observable market price to serve as an objective measure of the value. Added to 
this, publicly traded companies have to publicly disclose a lot of financial information about 
performance, future prospects etc. This could be seen as an advantage for private companies over 
public ones, but also it means the available information concerning privately held companies is 
often inaccurate or nonexistent. Due to these facts, a critical aspect in determining the fair market 
value (hereinafter FMV) of private company is the discount for lack of marketability (hereinafter 
DLOM). The lack of marketability means the inability of an investor or an owner to convert his or 
hers equity into cash quickly and at a reasonably low and predictable cost (Pratt, Reilly et al. 2000, 
392). In Dictionary of Business Terms (Friedman 2000, 410) marketability is described as follows; 
“speed and ease with which a particular product or investment may be bought and sold”. 
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Previous studies concerning private company discounts (e.g. Block 2007, Sarin 2001, Kooli, Kortas 
et al. 2003, Emory 2002, 1997) have shown that privately held companies suffer from a discount in 
price for reasons relating to marketability and/or liquidity. The lack of marketability is costly to 
investors not only because of cash flow considerations, but also because it can cause them to miss 
opportunities to rebalance their portfolios and allocate capital to alternative marketable assets 
(Kooli, Kortas et al. 2003). 
 
Nonetheless, on the other side of the coin are the premiums paid in acquisitions. Usually these 
premiums are paid for already publicly traded companies and in order to gain control. The latter can 
be defined, as an amount the buyer is willing to pay over the current market price to gain a control 
of the firm (Pratt 2001, 45). This type of control premium is often justified by the expected 
performance improvements, or by the expected synergies, such as cost savings and excess cash 
flows, or the fact that buyers are often strategically motivated and therefore the price they pay is not 
equivalent  to  FMV  (Nath  1997).  On  the  other  hand,  if  control  transactions  are  used  as  a  starting  
point for valuing something less than a controlling interest, then normally some discount for lack of 
control (hereinafter DLOC) is warranted (Pratt 2001, 31). Despite the fact that control and 
marketability are highly intertwined, I will mainly focus on the marketability point of view in this 
thesis. 
 
The objective of this study is to measure the average amount of discount in acquisitions for private 
U.S.-based companies and to further analyse what are the factors behind this phenomenon.  
 
1.2 MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
There are many occasions when valuation is needed. Traditionally these occasions include stock 
investments and venture capital investments. Other circumstances are for example initial public 
offerings (hereinafter IPO’s), share repurchases, granting of credit and mergers and acquisitions 
(hereinafter M&A). This study focuses only on M&A, since the objective is to find out the 
valuation differences between public and private acquisitions. For this studying purpose the best 
method is to examine historical acquisitions. I am also highly motivated in finding significant 
explanatory factors that could explain the causes leading valuation differences. 
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The sale of private companies and subsidiaries has become an increasingly important source of 
liquidity and restructuring for corporations, with almost two-thirds of acquisitions reported by the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) being of unlisted targets (Officer 2007). This implies the fact 
that M&A market for private companies is at least as important as the M&A market for public 
companies. However studies related to corporate valuation have concentrated mainly on publicly 
traded firms and yet to date academics have little to say about prices, premiums, or discounts in the 
M&A market for unlisted companies.  
 
Another emerging problem in Finland relates with already retiring generation, born after the Second 
World  War.  This  means  there  are  a  lot  of  small  business  entrepreneurs  who will  need  to  find  an  
outside buyer, if no continuator is found for their companies and family businesses. Needless to say, 
these companies are not able to go public, which would indeed make the selling process a whole lot 
easier. In such situations, I find it very important for these entrepreneurs to know how the valuation 
of a company is carried out and also what amount of discount is acceptable and why, when 
compared to public peer group companies. Therefore, I find this topic to be very current and 
important for us Finns, even though I will be studying only U.S-based companies instead of Finnish 
ones. The reasons to use only U.S.-based companies are explained in the following chapter. 
 
To sum up the previous, this thesis focuses on studying the private company discount with 
quantitative examination of U.S.-based acquisitions. Further on, I will analyse the data sample of 
historical acquisitions with regression models in order to find relevant explanatory factors for 
discounts (premiums). My desire is to find generalizable answers to explain the causes, which leads 
to lower (higher) prices in private company acquisitions compared to public ones. I believe in this 
way small business entrepreneurs could get indicates of what to expect when planning of selling 
their businesses and even possibility to make this gap of discount smaller.  
 
This thesis builds on previous studies of the private company discount by examining the 
phenomenon from M&A point of view. I find this perspective to give the most reliable and valid 
answers to my research problem, since I don’t need to make any assumptions concerning the data, 
but to study already realized acquisitions.  
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In the following chapter, I will describe how the study is done, the methods I will use, and what sort 
of companies and data I will use.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
According to Kooli, Kortas et al. (2003), there are at least four different approaches to investigate 
the private company discount; the IPO approach, the restricted stock approach, exit multiple 
approach and acquisition approach. The acquisition approach is the one chosen for this study. 
Furthermore, all of these approaches are discussed in Chapter 3 Theories to Approach Discount for 
Lack of Marketability. However, acquisition approach to study DLOM means that the aim is to 
gather and examine an adequate amount of data on acquisitions, for both, U.S.-based private and 
U.S.-based public companies. The purpose of this is to find comparable transactions of private and 
public companies.  
 
The process itself starts by identifying a set of acquisitions of private companies. Then for each of 
these transactions the aim is to find (1) a publicly traded company in the same industry, (2) is 
acquired at around the same time, and (3) is close to the size of a private company. The first two 
tasks are unambiguous, however company’s size can be measured in many ways, e.g. by the amount 
of assets, net sales, market value of equity or by number of employees. In this study, I will use net 
assets (total assets minus total liabilities) as an indicator of size. If such companies, which fully fills 
all these requirements, are to be found more than one, the one closest in size is to be chosen. This 
study examines only domestic U.S.-based companies and leaves out all the non-U.S. companies. 
Reason for this limitation is the fact that in order to build a comparable set of companies, the 
companies  must  operate  in  the  same  market  area,  and  within  the  same  nation.  This  way  
geographical nor economical disparity will not affect the results. In addition, also different 
accounting standards would have affect on the chosen measures. Furthermore, financial institutions 
and regulated public utilities are excluded from the study because these organisations have unique 
characteristics and may not be compared to the rest of the companies involved. To make my point, 
banks often have highly liquid assets, which can be easily converted into cash and due to this it is 
likely that the discount for illiquidity is smaller than for “traditional” private companies. Whereas 
public utilities, such as electricity, gas and water rarely face any competition and therefore they are 
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often  monopolies.  Based  on  the  facts  mentioned,  I  believe  taking  such  companies  into  the  study  
would most likely bring down the quality of results. 
  
An ideal situation would be to examine Finnish companies, but unfortunately under current 
circumstances this is not possible. Finnish law does not regulate markets to publish the data of 
private company acquisition, contrary to U.S. law, and therefore the information needed for 
studying DLOM is not public. The sample is selected from the SDC platinum and includes the years 
1989 – 2008. After sorting the data sample and finding the matching companies, the total number of 
companies is 242 (121 pairs). 
  
The acquisition approach estimates the marketability discount by calculating the purchase price 
multiples of various relevant financial parameters. In all of the multiples the numerator is the 
acquisition price of that particular company. Finally the amount of discount (premium) can be 
viewed by comparing the mean and median valuation multiples between public companies and 
private companies and the percentage difference between these two is the discount (premium). It is 
important to use potential measures of performance and size, which can be applied reliably to both 
the private and the public companies. The indicators I will use in this study to measure performance 
are earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization of intangibles (EBITDA). The reason I will use EBIT and EBITDA, rather than after 
tax measure, is because this way different capital structures of acquired companies will not have 
affect on valuation multiples. Hence, two companies with ideal profit flows may have different 
earning ratios due to differences in their capital structure. Therefore this would distort the 
comparability of the two companies. Both EBIT and EBITDA provide a measure of company’s free 
cash  flow  available  for  debt  payments  and  dividends  (taxes  are  considered  to  be  dividends).  The  
difference between EBIT and EBITDA is that EBIT is net from depreciation and amortization, 
which are non-cash expenses, whereas EBITDA adds back depreciation and amortization. This way 
EBITDA eliminates the chance of different depreciation policies from affecting the multiples. The 
indicators to measure size will be net assets and total sales. The rationale for using purchase price to 
sales multiple is that companies seeking to expand their operations, according to Koeplin, Sarin et 
al. (2000), are often interested in the price paid per additional dollar of sales. It is interesting to see 
whether acquirers have paid higher prices for public companies and if they have, can we conclude 
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that the acquirers consider one dollar of sales of public company to be more valuable than one 
dollar of private company sales? 
 
In  the  second  stage  of  the  study,  the  possible  discounts  are  further  analysed  with  multiple  linear  
regression models. This phase focuses on examining the purchase price differences between the 
private and public targets, what causes these differences, and possible explanatory factors leading to 
private company discounts. Explanatory factors are expected to relate to company’s size, 
performance, capital adequacy, industry and acquisition time.  
 
Previous studies (see e.g. Officer 2007, Koeplin, Sarin et al. 2000, Bajaj, Denis et al. 2001) that 
have estimated the discount for private companies have used relatively same method as described 
above. However, I find these studies to somewhat lack in the specific examination of the causes to 
discount. This study will bring additional value to previous studies by examining the causes behind 
the valuation differences with regression models. 
 
I  will  not examine purchase prices,  nor try to do any corrections to it.  Therefore,  I  will  use exact 
figures as given from the data sources. The reasons why no adjustments will be made to these 
figures are firstly due to the big sample size and secondly because it would require special firm-
specific knowledge of all the companies and enormous amount of time to do the adjustments. 
However, the most common valuation methods will be described briefly in Chapter 2.4 Valuation 
Methods. This way the reader will understand the basics of valuation, the complexity with different 
methods, and how the valuation multiples approach is carried through in the empirical analysis 
phase. 
 
The main reason why multiples analysis is chosen to measure the discounts (premiums) is its 
usability. When considering company valuation process, multiples valuation unlike the discounted 
cash flow and discounted dividend model, do not require detailed multiple-year forecasts about a 
variety of parameters, including growth, profitability, and cost of capital (Palepu, Healy et al. 2004). 
Another reason why multiple analyses is chosen is because valuation based on price multiples is 
still very commonly used method by appraisers and therefore, I felt it would bring real life 
practicality into this study. 
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1.4 RESULTS 
 
The received results using the multiples valuation method suggest that private company discounts 
exists on average, where the magnitude of discount varies, depending on the valuation multiple 
used. The smallest amount of discount was found when measured by the Transaction price-to-EBIT 
multiple; 13.2% and the largest discount was found when the depreciations and amortizations was 
added back to EBIT. The Transaction price-to-EBITDA multiple yielded a hefty discount of 28.7%. 
The remaining two multiples, Transaction price-to-Net assets and Transaction price-to-Sales, 
yielded discounts of 15.2% and 17.3% respectively. Although each of the mean values presented 
discounts, Transaction price-to-Net assets and Transaction price-to-Sales median values were -
35.1% (premium) and -50.5% (premium) respectively. These results are quite controversial and due 
to the premiums presented, it was insufficient to say that private company discounts exist based on 
the multiples valuation analysis. Multiples valuation method, however, provided strong evidence 
that private company valuation differs drastically from public companies. 
 
Regression analysis found several explanatory variables affecting to the transaction price and 
causing the transaction price gap between private and public companies. It seems that the amount of 
net assets, sales, and EBITDA had statistically significant, positive association to the transaction 
price paid by the acquirer. Moreover, if the acquired company operated in one of the following 
industries, it was expected to suffer transaction price discount, compared to the benchmark industry: 
Wholesale & Retail Trade, Computer Integrated Systems Design, and Engineering & Management 
Services. However, in general, no evidence could be found that neither the targets status, nor the 
acquisition time would affect the acquisition price paid. Therefore, it is safe to say that private 
company discounts do not exists when studied with regression analysis.  
 
The acquisition price difference, between private and public targets, could be argued to occur due to 
the  size  differences  among  the  net  assets,  sales,  and  EBITDA.  Additionally,  in  the  following  
industries the transaction price differences, between the private and public targets, were larger than 
in the benchmark industry: Manufacturing, Computer Integrated Systems Design, and Computer 
Related Services & Business Services. 
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The independent variables, causing the private companies to sell at a lower price, compared to 
public peer companies, were revealed in the final regression model. The evidence suggests that both 
net assets and net debt have decreasing effects on the transaction price gap. There could not be 
found any causal relationships between the industries and the transaction price gap. However, the 
acquisition year 2000 proved significant and positive association to the transaction price gap, 
meaning the companies acquired on that particular year did not suffer as substantial price reduction 
as did the companies acquired on the benchmark year. 
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
This thesis is divided into 7 Chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the motives for mergers and acquisitions, 
reviews valuation theories, and theories that explain the characters of M&A. Chapter 3 present 
different theories of how to approach discount for lack of marketability. Chapter 4 presents 
theoretical hypotheses, of which will be tested in this thesis. Chapter 5 presents the research design, 
which includes the sample description, variable definition, and the methodology that will be 
applied. Chapter 6 will be dedicated to empirical testing of the hypotheses with correlation 
coefficients, multiples valuation analysis, and various multiple regression models. The findings are 
presented in this chapter. Chapter 7 summarises the findings, offers conclusions, presents the 
shortcomings and weaknesses of this thesis, and offers implications for future research. 
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2 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  review  some  of  the  most  widely  known  M&A  and  valuation  theories  
presented in financial literature.   
2.1 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN GENERAL 
 
Mergers and acquisitions have long been a popular form of corporate investment, particularly in 
countries with Anglo-American forms of capital markets (Palepu, Healy et al. 2004). 
Diversification to a new geographical market area, or to a new area of operation, can often be easier 
by buying a company that is already operating in that particular area, than to start from scratch. 
Previous studies have shown that there is no question the target firm shareholders are clearly 
winners in merger transactions (see e.g. Antoniou, Arbour et al. 2008 and, Andrade, Mitchell et al. 
2001). However, the case with private companies is not as obvious as with publicly traded 
companies. Not even a decade ago, we witnessed how this so-called Dot-Com bubble burst. During 
this stock market bubble, numerous internet-based Dot-com companies engaged in unusual and 
daring business practices with the hopes of dominating the market. Somewhat surprising was that 
investors were willing to invest large sums of money into this risky business. IPO studies during the 
Dot-com bubble show clearly the mispricing that took place. First-day returns on IPO’s for Internet 
companies averaged a stunning 89 percent during 1999 and 2000 (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003).  
 
Probably the most common way to look mergers is from an efficiency point of view. An obvious 
explanation for mergers is that companies are seeking for efficiencies in mergers in the ways of 
gaining synergies operating together, compared with situation where merger and acquirer both 
would be individual entities. 
2.2 MOTIVES FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
Creating new economic value for shareholders should be considered the ultimate motive for M&A. 
Palepu, Healy et al. (2004, 11-1 - 11-2) lists that new economic value can be created by taking 
advantage of the economies of scale, improving target management, combining complementary 
resources, capturing tax benefits, providing low-cost financing to a financially constrained target, 
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and  increasing  product-market  rent.  As  we  can  see,  there  are  many  possible  ways  to  create  
additional value. 
 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) summarize the management’s motives of M&A, advanced in the 
literature, into three main categories. These three motives for M&A are the synergy motive, the 
agency motive, and hubris. Probably the most common motive, synergy, suggests that takeovers 
occur because of economic gains that result by merging the resources of two companies. The 
synergy motive assumes the managers of both, targets and acquirers, are to maximize shareholder 
wealth,  and  therefore  will  engage  in  takeover  activity  only  if  it  results  gains  to  both  parties.  The  
agency motive considers mergers to be merely management’s way to build their own image and 
empire at the expense of shareholders. The hubris hypothesis suggests that managers make mistakes 
in evaluating target firms, and engage in acquisitions even when there is no synergy. The hubris 
hypothesis assumes that the management will engage in takeovers only when it overestimates the 
gains. The higher the target gain means lower the bidder gain and higher the price that shareholders 
of acquirers have to carry (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993). Typically these gains are measured by 
calculating the abnormal stock returns at the announcement of the acquisition. The motives, gains, 
correlations, and value changes are summarized in Table 1 as shown. 
Table 1 Model of takeover motives and gains 
This  model  shows  the  correlations  between  target  and  total  gains,  as  well  as  the  correlations  
between target gain and acquirer gain, considered from the three alternative motives for M&A 
presented by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993).   
 
                                                                                        Correlation between 
Hypothesis Target Gain and Total Gain Target Gain and Acquirer Gain 
Synergy Positive Positive 
Agency Negative Negative 
Hubris Zero Negative 
Source: (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993) 
 
In the following chapters I will discuss these three motives of M&A more detailed. In addition, I 
will  present  other  theories  of  M&A,  such  as  neoclassical  theory  of  M&A  and  market  mispricing  
theory. Finally, I will examine the concept of information asymmetry, which relates with the 
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problem where one party has more or better information than the other. This is often the case with 
private companies and looking from M&A point of view, this can lead to adverse selection.  
 
2.2.1 Neoclassical theory of M&A 
 
One of the puzzles in finance is why there are periods when mergers are plentiful and other periods 
when merger activity is much smaller. The neoclassical explanation for merger activity is that 
mergers  are  an  efficient  response  to  reorganization  opportunities  that  arise  as  a  result  of  some  
underlying economic event (Rhodes–Kropf, Robinson et al. 2005). Several studies (see e.g. 
Mitchell and Mulherin 1996, Jensen 1993, Morck, Shleifer et al. 1990, Gort 1969) support this view 
by showing that merger activity is a result of industry-level shocks, such as technological 
innovations and excess capacity, supply shocks, and deregulation. However, Harford (2005) argues 
that whether the shock leads to a high merger activity depends on whether there is sufficient overall 
capital liquidity. Harford also states that this macro-level liquidity component causes industry 
merger waves to cluster in time, even if industry shocks do not.  
 
The neoclassical theory further suggests that merger and acquisition activity allows for a 
reallocation of assets from less efficient to users that are more efficient. To support this explanation, 
Healy, Palepu et al. (1992) showed that merged firms have significant improvements in operating 
cash flow returns after the merger, resulting from increases in asset productivity relative to their 
industries. Mergers also offer a chance for efficient managers to take over inefficient ones. 
 
The neoclassical theory of M&A is closely attached to synergy hypothesis. Synergy hypothesis 
assumes that bidder and target are after mutual interest and managers will take part on takeovers 
only when profits are positive for both parties. Synergy hypothesis will be reviewed more detailed 
later on this chapter. 
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2.2.2 Market mispricing theory 
 
Market mispricing theory is also known as market timing theory. The fundamental assumption of 
this theory is that financial markets are inefficient and therefore some companies are valued 
incorrectly. In contrast, managers are completely rational, understand stock market inefficiencies, 
and take advantage of them, in part through merger decisions. Mergers in this theory are a form of 
arbitrage by rational managers operating in inefficient markets. (Shleifer and Vishny 2003). Shleifer 
and Vishny predicts that buyers try to profit either, by buying undervalued targets for cash at a price 
below fundamental value, or by paying stock for targets that, even if overvalued, are less 
overvalued than the bidder.  
 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) and Rhodes-Kropf and Wiswanathan (2004) show in their studies 
that period of high stock valuation correlates with high merger activity. Ang and Cheng (2006) and 
Dong, Hirshleifer et al. (2006) provide direct evidence that if a company’s stock is highly valued/ 
overvalued, it can create an incentive to become an acquirer and to use stocks as a method of 
payment, rather than cash. This leads to an interesting question; why would a value-maximizing 
target  knowingly  accept  overvalued  stocks  in  a  takeover  offer.  To  answer  this  question,  Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson et al. (2005) propose a rational theory based on correlated misinformation. They 
argue that errors in valuing potential takeover synergies correlate with overall valuation error. 
Alternatively, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a theory based on an irrational stock market and 
self-interested managers who can cash out quickly. These managers do not maximize long-term 
shareholder value and instead maximize their own short-run gain. 
 
In their research, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson et al. (2005) found support to the fact that acquiring 
firms are significantly priced higher than targets. The valuation difference was roughly 20% of the 
target’s log Market-to-Book ratio. They also found evidence that the method of payment determines 
whether the target is over- or undervalued. On average cash targets are more undervalued than stock 
targets and cash acquirers are less overvalued than stock acquirers. 
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2.2.3 Synergy 
 
The synergy motive is based on an assumption where managers act on behalf of shareholder’s 
interest. As mentioned previously, the principal goal for the managers of target and acquirer is to 
maximize shareholder wealth, and would engage in mergers activity only if it results gains to both 
set of shareholders. However, this leads to an important question whether the combined returns for 
both parties are positive or negative? Healy, Palepu et al. (1992), Jensen and Ruback (1983), and 
Jarrel, Brickley et al. (1988) found that corporate takeovers generate positive gains, which target 
shareholders benefit, and that bidding company shareholders do not lose. These studies provide 
evidence against zero sum game, which means the gains for target company shareholders are not a 
redistribution resulting from losses to acquiring company shareholders. 
 
Bradley, Desai et al. (1988) defines synergy as an attempt by the bidding firm to exploit a profit 
opportunity that could be created by a change in economic conditions. This change could be the 
result of a change in supply and/ or demand, technological innovations, or purposeful investment by 
the bidding firm. However the synergies created by the merger may result from more efficient 
management, economies of scale, improved production techniques, the combination of 
complementary  resources,  the  redeployment  of  assets  to  more  profitable  uses,  the  exploitation  of  
market  power,  or  any  number  of  value  creating  mechanisms  that  fall  under  the  general  rubric  of  
corporate synergy (Bradley, Desai et al. 1988). 
 
Financial synergy is obtained from a merger if combined value of the two merging companies 
exceeds the sum of the market values of the two separate companies. Financial synergy in a merger 
can happen as far as the cash flows of two firms are not perfectly correlated.  
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To measure the total synergistic gains of a successful merger is the sum of the change in the wealth 
of the stockholders of the target and acquiring company: 
 
      (1) 
 
where 
 
  = Total synergistic gain, 
  = Change in target-firm shareholders’ wealth, and 
  = Change in acquiring-firm shareholders’ wealth. 
 
2.2.4 Hubris 
 
Succeeding in acquisitions is critically important for acquirers, but a successive bid of a target 
company does not necessarily mean an overall success. The case indeed can be that there are many 
bidders for a target and a wide range of bids are likely to arise. When it is difficult to estimate the 
real value of a target, then often the winner is the bidder with the highest, over-optimistic estimate 
of the target’s value. In such situation the bidder is actually paying more than the target is worth and 
in effect losing money. This kind of management hubris or overconfidence is commonly called the 
winner’s curse.  
 
One of the first  major articles to suggest that  management hubris could be one of the explanatory 
factors for M&A activity was written by Roll (1986). Roll questions whether there really exists any 
takeover gain at all. He argues that at least a part of the large price increase in target firm share 
price is merely a transfer from the bidding firm, meaning the takeover premium overstates the 
increase in economic value of the corporate combination. The logic behind Roll’s theory is that the 
valuation, made by the acquirer, can be considered as random variable. More precisely, the true 
value is considered to be the current stock price (mean) and as a result the valuation output varies 
around the true value. A valuation output that exceeds the true value leads to an offer; otherwise 
there is no offer. Therefore, we only observe offers that are too high on average and that the 
takeover premium is simply a random error, a mistake made by the bidding firm (Roll 1986). One 
could ask a simple question; why would managers make bids in the first place, if there would not be 
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any value in takeovers? Roll (1986) suggests that not every individual behaves like a rational 
economic human being, and therefore management does not necessarily intentionally act against 
shareholders interests. Intentionally or not, Grinblatt’s and Keloharju’s recent paper: Sensation 
seeking, Overconfidence and Trading Activity (2009) shows that different psychological characters 
can define variances in trading activity between individual investors. For instance sensation 
seeking, a measurable psychological trait linked to gambling, risky driving, drug abuse, and a host 
of other behaviors, is more abundant in males (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2009). Sensation seekers 
search for novel, intense, and varied sensations and experiences generally associated with real or 
imagined physical, social, and financial risks (Zuckerman 1979, 10). Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) 
show that such individuals who are most prone to sensation seeking, and who are most 
overconfident about their abilities and knowledge, trade stocks the most. Similarly, managers with 
these attributes described are prone to take excess risks in mergers. This supports Rolls’ (1986) 
suggestion that there is no evidence to indicate that every individual behaves as if he or she is a 
rational economic human being whose behavior seems revealed by the behavior or market prices. 
Indeed, one possible definition of irrational or aberrant behavior is independence across individuals. 
 
2.2.5 Agency theory 
 
Schroeder, Clark et al. (2009, 124) defines agency as a consensual relationship between two parties, 
whereby one party (agent) agrees to act  on behalf  of the other party (principal).  A typical agency 
relationship is between managers of a corporation and shareholders. The owners may not have the 
expertise or training to run a company and therefore need to employ someone to represent them. 
These employees are agents who are entrusted with power to make decisions on behalf of the 
shareholders’ (principals) best interest. However, the shareholders cannot observe every decision 
made by the agents, and therefore a risk exists that the agents will try to pursue their own interests. 
The main dilemma indeed is that usually individuals maximize their own expected utilities and by 
doing  so,  manager’s  interest  may  differ  radically  from  the  stockholders’  (Schroeder,  Clark  et  al.  
2009, 124).  
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Often referred as the father of modern economics, Adam Smith wrote about agency problem in his 
well-known book The Wealth of Nations as follows: 
 
The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s 
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with 
the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider 
attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give 
themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must 
always prevail, more or Iess, in the management of the affairs of such a company. 
(Smith 1776, Cannan Edition, Book IV, 264-265). 
 
Agency relationship involves costs to the principal. However, costs to principal can limit 
divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring 
monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Monitoring expenditures by the principal are cost from controlling the agent’s behavior (e.g. costs 
of observing and measuring the agent’s behavior, external and internal auditors). In addition to 
monitoring efforts, the manager can mitigate agency costs through bonding efforts. Bonding cost 
are those the manager takes upon himself to reduce agency conflicts, that is, efforts undertaken at 
the expense of his own utility (e.g. management compensation). Management compensation is often 
stock and option based, meaning the amount of compensation is tied to a stock price. This may lead 
to a situation where executives try to “manage” earnings in order to push the stock price higher. 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) found evidence in their study that CEO’s whose overall 
compensation were more sensitive to company share prices, were the ones who led the companies 
with highest level of earnings management. Finally, even with monitoring and bonding 
expenditures, there will be some amount of reduction in welfare for the principal due to the actions 
taken by the agent versus the actions principal would take. This type of negative wealth effect is 
called residual loss (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
 
Jensen (1986) argues that managers have incentives to cause their companies to grow beyond the 
optimal size, in order to increase power, by increasing the resources under their control. According 
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to Jensen, this agency conflict seems to be most severe with companies with largest amount of free 
cash flow, or cash flows above to meet shareholder payments, and to fund positive net present value 
(NPV) projects. In such situations, shareholders would prefer these excess cash flows to be paid out. 
However, managers with excess cash on hands are more likely to spend it on acquisitions than pay 
it out on dividends, even if an acquisition has a negative NPV. This type of agency cost of free cash 
flow can be substantial in cash rich companies. Further, Jensen suggests that companies with high 
cash reserves should pay out all excess cash to reduce managers’ ability to destroy firm value. By 
doing so, the management needs to be more financial market orientated when seeking for additional 
funding. 
 
As stated by Lambert (2001), the primary way agency theory differs from traditional information 
economics (see e.g. Stigler 1961) is that multi-person, incentive, asymmetric information, and/ or 
coordination issues are important in understanding how corporations operate. Lambert argues that 
agency theory is about evaluating the impacts of interest conflicts that arises from principal-agent 
relationship. These conflicts occur due to (1) shirking by the agent, (2) diversion of resources for 
agents private consumption or use, (3) differential time horizons, and (4) differential risk aversion 
of the agent and principal (Lambert 2001).  
 
2.2.6 Information asymmetry 
 
In a perfect exchange world, market participants would have full information about the securities 
being exchanged, prices would reflect this information, and bid-asked spreads would be a tiny 
percentage of the bid price. Thus, the spread would reflect only the production costs of executing a 
transaction. In this stylized world, there are no information asymmetries. Prices of securities are 
therefore efficiently priced; that is, security prices reflect all known information about risks and 
opportunities. In the real world, things are not this tidy. 
 
One of the first papers to discuss information asymmetry was made by the Nobel Prize winner 
George Akerlof (1970). Akerlof uses the market for second hand cars (The Market for Lemons) as 
an example to illustrate the problem with uncertainty of quality. Used cars market captures 
brilliantly the essence of information asymmetry; the owner has more- and better quality 
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information about the car, than the buyer (e.g. service history, accident history, flaws, previous 
owners), of which may affect the buyer’s willingness to purchase the vehicle. Basically, this means 
that the individuals buying a second hand car do not know whether the car they buy is a good one, 
or  a  bad  one  (a  lemon).  What  they  do  know  is  that  with  probability  q the car is good and with 
probability  (1-q) the car is a lemon; by assumption, q is the proportion of good cars in the market 
and (1-q) is the proportion of lemons (Akerlof 1970).  
 
Similarly, managers normally have an advantage over the market in predicting firm specific events. 
Obviously, the managers have better quality, or more timely information about the company than 
the market. This creates an information asymmetry between the managers of the company and the 
market that can vary over the lifetime of the companies. The information asymmetry of the 
company is considered high (low) when managers of the company have relatively large (small) 
amount of firm-specific information (Dierkens 1991).  
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) have developed an equilibrium model, which suggests that management 
may refuse to invest in valuable investment projects when equity issue is needed. Their model 
assumes that the managers have varying amount of first hand information the investors do not have 
and they both realize this fact. The idea behind this model is that given asymmetric information, a 
company with insufficient financial slack may not undertake all investment opportunities with 
positive  NPV.  The  model  assumes  that  a  stock  issue  to  finance  the  investment(s)  signals  that  the  
stock is overvalued, and therefore it tends to push the stock price down. Conversely, investors could 
take managements decision not to issue shares as “good news” (Myers and Majluf 1984). 
 
2.3 VALUATION THEORY 
 
The most difficult decision an executive faces in negotiating an acquisition is the price to be 
paid. The decision is difficult because there are so many factors to consider – the process by 
which the target company is being sold, the expected competition, the future profitability of 
the target, expected synergies, complex tax rules, alternate legal forms of effecting a 
transaction and accounting considerations. (Marren 1993, p.v). 
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2.3.1 Valuation in general 
 
As shown in Figure 1, there are many options what control owner and minority owner can do when 
liquidating, or exiting. A minority owner is one who exchanges money for the right to receive future 
cash  flows,  but  has  no  control  over  the  decision  the  company may take.  A control  owner  has  the  
power to control the assets of the company and to decide when and to what extent of cash flows will 
be distributed.  However, there is no general rule, which method gives the best outcome. It is a sum 
of many factors, such as economical situation, industrial situation, future prospects, number of 
potential buyers, and method of payment that should be taken into consideration when choosing the 
method to liquidate or exit.  
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Figure 1 Levels of value in private companies 
This figure shows the various options for private company owners’ for exit or liquidity. Two views 
are presented: owners’ perspective and minority owners’ perspective. 
 
Source: (Pratt 2001, 7) 
 
 
 
CONTROL 
OWNER 
LEVEL OF 
VALUE 
MINORITY 
OWNER 
OPTIONS FOR EXIT OR LIQUIDITY 
x Take company public 
x Sell in M&A market 
x Liquidate 
x Some combination of the above 
 
 
OPTIONS FOR EXIT OR LIQUIDITY 
x Sell to outsider 
x Sell to insider 
x Redemption 
x Buy and hold 
x Receipts of dividends in perpetuity 
x Receipts of dividends during holding period 
and then some exit or liquidity event either as a 
minority or control transaction 
x Maybe no exit option 
 
 
METHODS FOR VALUATION 
x Guideline public companies* 
          (market approach) 
x Guideline M&A transactions 
          (market approach) 
x Liquidation analysis 
          (asset approach) 
x Discounted cash flow 
          (income approach) 
x Highest value derived from above 
methods is value of control 
 
 
METHODS FOR VALUATION 
DIRECT 
x Discounted future benefits analysis (DFBA) 
(e.g., dividends, minority interest cash flows 
and future exit assumption 
x Capitalize minority owner benefits 
(dividends or earning s) at appropriate 
required rate of return 
x Prior transactions 
x Buy-sell agreement provisions 
INDIRECT 
x Apply discounts for both lack of control 
and lack of marketability or lack of 
liquid ity from value to control owner 
 
* Guideline Public Companies Method entails  a  comparison of the subject company to 
publicly traded peer companies. 
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2.4 VALUATION METHODS 
 
First in this chapter, the two most commonly used methods; Discounted Cash Flow Method (DCF) 
and Multiples Valuation Method are presented to carry out valuation. The latter method is often 
applied, because it is simple to use. The DCF method is more complex, because it requires 
information  on  a  number  of  factors.  After  these  two methods,  I  will  describe  the  models  that  are  
more focused to produce values for private companies.  
 
In a perfect world where all information is available, theoretically, a value of a company would be 
independent of the method used. Meaning, all methods would derive the same result. However, as 
we know this is not the case in real-life. Therefore different methods produce different valuations. 
That is why valuation analyst often uses multiple methods side by side and then weights each value 
to create what is finally an expected value of the target company. As stated earlier, valuation 
methods include different assumptions and that is why the results between two individuals valuing 
the same target can be so different. Acquirer’s and target’s interests are generally different. Where 
acquirer does not want to overpay, the target naturally aims to get the price as high as possible. To 
conclude, valuation is always more or less subjective, depending on the assumptions made by the 
valuation analyst. Therefore it is impossible to point out one method that is ultimately the best for 
every situation.  
 
2.4.1 Discounted Cash Flow Method 
 
John  Burr  Williams  was  amongst  the  first  to  present  the  theory  of  Discounted  Cash  Flow  based  
valuation in his dissertation work: The Theory of Investment Value (1940). DCF models build on 
an  idea  that  a  value  of  an  asset  today  is  the  sum  of  all  future  cash  flows  discounted  at  the  
opportunity cost of capital (Brealey, Myers et al. 2008, 102). According to Oded and Michel (2007), 
there are four methods to value a company using DCF: 1) Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF), 2) 
Adjusted Present Value (APV), 3) Capital Cash Flows (CCF), and 4) Cash Flows to Equity (CFE). 
Main differences between these four models are among the cash flows that are discounted and the 
particular discount rate.  
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The following equation expresses the essence of future cash flows discounted into present value: 
 
(2)      
where 
V0  = The value of the asset at time t = 0  
CFt  = The cash flow (or the expected cash flow) at time t 
r  = The discount rate or required rate of return  
 
Although the DCF looks simple at the paper, it can be challenging when applying the theory into 
practice. According to Stowe et al. (2002, 41-42), there are four steps in applying DCF analysis to 
valuation; (1) choose appropriate DCF model, (2) forecast the cash flows, (3) choose a discount rate 
methodology, and (4) estimate the discount rate.  
 
The problem with this method is that it requires quite much estimation about the future. It is 
difficult, if not impossible to predict company’s future cash flows year after year, not to mention the 
difficulty  to  estimate  a  proper  discount  rate.  We  have  to  bear  in  mind  that  basically  we  are  
estimating future cash flows from here to eternity. To help predicting future cash flows and to value 
an  entire  company  we  can  apply  Gordon’s  constant  growth  model  (Gordon  and  Eli  1956)  to  our  
DCF model. This model assumes that FCFF grow indefinitely at a constant rate. FCFF is the cash 
flow available to the company’s suppliers of capital after all expenses have been paid and necessary 
investments in working capital and fixed capital have been made (Stowe 2002, 115). The 
appropriate discount rate to use with Gordon model is weighted average cost of capital (WACC). In 
mathematical terms, we can put this model as: 
 
                             , or               (3) 
    
where 
V0 = The value of the company at time t = 0 
FCFF = Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
g = Expected growth rate 
r = The discount rate 
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The Gordon model is often useful tool for valuing companies with stable growth-rate. However, it 
does not apply well on young companies with unstable growth. Also a downside with this method is 
that it is very sensitive to changes in assumed growth rate and discount rate. It is highly advisable to 
build sensitivity analysis to see how the results may vary if one ore more assumptions are changed.   
 
2.4.2 Multiples Valuation Method 
 
Multiples valuation method is also known as comparable company analysis. Multiples valuation 
method, like DCF method, is among the most widely used tools in practise to value companies. 
Probable  reasons  why multiples  valuation  is  so  popular  are  that  it  is  easy  and  quick  to  apply  and  
also very simple to understand. To make multiples valuation more reliable, the analysts often use 
combinations of multiples, or by calculating several year average values for multiples.  
 
Market multiples are ratios of a stock’s market price to some measure of value per share (Stowe 
2002, 180). However, it is merely impossible to use stock price as a numerator for private 
companies, since the stocks may not be marketable and for sure not traded on public stock 
exchanges. Therefore, I will use purchase price (transaction value) as a numerator instead of stock 
price. This way a multiple is a proportion of purchase price to some fundamental variable.  
 
DCF models are often emphasized in literature to be the most appropriate techniques for valuation. 
However, in practise, estimating the cash flows accurately and choosing the appropriate discount 
rate is difficult, therefore DCF analysis is often abandoned in favour of multiples valuation. 
Multiples valuation is far more straightforward than DCF model. Company valuation via multiples 
starts by calculating the multiples for a set of benchmark or public peer group companies. Next the 
value is estimated by multiplying the calculated (average, median) ratio from the set of companies, 
which were chosen by the performance measure for the company being valued (Kaplan and Ruback 
1995). For example if the average purchase price-to-EBIT multiple for public peer group companies 
would be four, then the value for a private company would be four times the EBIT of that particular 
company.  
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The multiples used in this thesis to measure the valuation differences between public and private 
companies are purchase price-to-net assets, purchase price-to-sales, purchase price-to-EBIT, and 
purchase price-to-EBITDA. It is important to notice that different multiples can give more accurate 
and reliable results for different industries. For example enterprise value to revenue multiple works 
well with service and high tech industries, while enterprise value to assets multiple is more 
appropriate for banking and insurance industries. Enterprise value can be defined by multiplying the 
shares outstanding by the market value and then by adding convertible securities, short-term debt, 
straight debt, preferred equity minus cash and marketable securities (Koeplin, Sarin et al. 2000). 
 
2.4.3 Residual Income Valuation 
 
The Residual Income Model (RIM), also known as the Clean Surplus Model, was initially 
introduced in an article made by James A. Ohlson (1995). The essence behind this theory is that the 
value of a company can be expressed in terms of accounting variables. This is somewhat different 
way to approach valuation, since traditionally the value of a company is expressed in terms of 
finance, i.e. present value of dividends (Dividend Discount Model) or present value of expected 
future cash flows (Discounted Cash Flow). RIM is in fact a variant of the discounted cash flow 
model, discounting accounting numbers instead of future cash flows. Therefore the same limitations 
that exist with the DCF model, i.e. sensitivity to changes in growth rate and discount rate, should be 
taken into consideration when applying RIM.  
 
Under RIM, the value of a company consists of book value and the net present value of expected 
future abnormal earnings. Feltham and Ohlson (1995) define the abnormal earnings (goodwill) as 
what  the  firm  earns  in  excess  of  its  normal  earning  of  the  period.  The  normal  earnings  are  
comprised of the risk free rate times the beginning period book value. As DCF model, also RIM 
model has several assumptions; no arbitrage opportunities, dividends are irrelevant, accounting is 
unbiased, time horizon is infinite, and all gains and losses go through net income. Needles to say, 
that this is not quite how the markets operate at present. 
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Francis, Olsson et al. (2000) expresses the market equity value as a function of book value and 
abnormal earnings: 
      (4) 
 
 
  
where 
 
VtAE = Market value of equity at time t 
AEt = Abnormal returns in year t 
rE = Equity cost of capital 
Bt = Book value of equity at the end of year t 
T = Forecasted time period, 1… 
Xt = Earnings in year t 
 
The RIM is indeed a very useful tool in predicting future earnings. The model concentrates on 
exploring how current financial statement information can be used to improve future predictions. 
Better earnings prediction enables better estimates of unrecorded abnormal earnings and the quality 
of financial statement information. However, the RIM model has also been criticized by its lack of 
implementation to real world situations. Lo and Lys (2000) argues that the model has been 
developed in the context of perfect capital markets and it does not incorporate the effect of taxes, 
bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and asymmetric information.  
 
2.4.4 Quantitative Marketability Discount Method 
 
Christopher Z. Mercer created the Quantitative Marketability Discount Model (hereinafter QMDM) 
and it was formally introduced in his book Quantifying Marketability Discounts (1997). The 
QMDM is a shareholder-level DCF model that uses a quantitative analysis to precisely calculate the 
DLOM (Mercer 2008, 3-38). QMDM model has same characters as Gordon’s constant growth 
tttt
tEtt
T
t
t
E
t
t
AE
t
DIVXBB
BrXAE
r
AEBV
 
 
 

 
¦
1
1 )1(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33
model, which I presented earlier, since QMDM also requires estimations about future growth rate 
and required rate of return.  
 
The model simply estimates a time horizon at which the investment will be liquidated, liquidating 
price based on annual percentage growth in value from the valuation date, and interim cash flow to 
the holder (Pratt 2001, 411). An important note to be made is that the focus here is on expected 
growth rate in value rather than expected growth rate in earnings. The model assumes that all 
earnings are reinvested at the growth rate of value and not distributed to the holders before 
liquidation at the end of holding period. Ultimately, an investor wants to know the present value of 
an investment in question. Therefore, we need to discount the terminal value at the end of holding 
period to present value. The discount rate that will be applied is investor’s required holding period 
rate of return.  
 
When applying the QMDM, the appraiser first values the subject company at the entity level, 
resulting in a stock valuation as if the stock was readily marketable. Next, the shareholder value is 
calculated. The shareholder value represents the non-marketable value of the subject stock. To 
calculate the shareholder value, the appraiser increases the value of the subject company by the 
growth rate during the expected holding period. The appraiser next discounts the future company 
value using the required rate of holding period return. The resulting value equals to shareholder 
value. From here we can calculate the DLOM according to QMDM, which is one minus the ratio of 
shareholder value to enterprise value.  
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The equation to calculate the marketability discount is as follows: 
 
     (5) 
 
where 
 
 
where  
MD = Marketability Discount 
PV = Present Value to shareholder 
V0 = Base value 
g = Expected growth rate 
r = Required rate of holding period return 
 
QMDM model itself  has some typical flaws common to present value methods.  For example,  the 
model is very sensitive for holding period assumption. The appraiser’s task is to narrow the ranges 
of all the assumptions that need to be made. However, QMDM, which is used primarily in valuing 
privately held companies, develops concrete estimates of expected growth in value of the company 
and reasonable estimates of additional risk premiums to account for risks faced by investors in non-
marketable minority interest of companies (Pratt 2001, 193).  
 
2.4.5 Economic Component Model 
 
Jay B. Abrams originally introduced Economic Component Model (ECM) in his article, Discount 
for Lack of Marketability: a Theoretical Model (1994). The ECM contains three components that 
act  as  “building  blocks”  in  calculating  DLOM.  The  components  are  (1)  delay  to  sale,  (2)  buyer  
monopsony power, and (3) buyers’ and sellers’ transaction costs. Delay to sale component is the 
economic disadvantage of the considerable time it takes to sell a privately held business if 
compared to an almost instantaneous ability to sell stocks of a public company. Basically what this 
means is a discount due to illiquidity and the risks involved, e.g. changes in the business 
environment and inability to reinvest the money in other lucrative investments. Monopsony power 
 
MD  1 PV
V0
§
©¨
·
¹¸
 
PV  1 g
1 r
§
©¨
·
¹¸
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35
of the buyer means when the markets for privately held business is thin a single buyer – a 
monopsonist – can drive price down by withholding purchase (Abrams 2000, 257). Similarly, in a 
single seller situation a monopolist can drive price up by withholding production. Therefore, this 
discount should be applied to small, unexciting companies with only one or few interested buyers. 
Transaction costs when selling a private company is often substantially higher than for selling 
stocks in publicly traded company. Transaction costs consists of legal, accounting, and appraisal 
fees.  
 
We can present the model as a fairly simple equation: 
 
     (6) 
and 
    (7) 
 
where 
 
DLOMCI = Total discount for lack of marketability for a control interest 
DLOMMI = Total discount for lack of marketability for a minority interest 
D1 = Discount due to delay of the sale 
D2 = Discount due to monopsony power of the buyer 
D3 = Discount due to the uncertainty of the sale 
M = Minority interest discount 
 
What Abrams (1994) means with the uncertainty of the sale, is that the subject company may not be 
interesting in the eyes of potential buyers and therefore a discount in FMV needs to be applied. 
 
DLOMCI  1 1 D1 1D2 1D3 > @
DLOMMI  1 1 M 1D1 1D2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3 THEORIES TO APPROACH DISCOUNTS FOR LACK OF MARKETABILITY  
 
Adjusting for levels of control and marketability can be very complicated, but still very important 
topic among understanding the discounts applied to privately held companies. This chapter will 
discuss different approaches to study how to measure the DLOM in private companies. The focus 
will be on two of the lowest levels shown on Figure 2. Control premium and strategic premium will 
be left out from this study, since these two would be hard to measure and study in cases of private 
companies and these two does not relate substantially to this thesis. 
 
Figure 2 Levels to approach Fair Market Value 
This figure demonstrates the levels toward the fair market value (Strategic Value). The lowest level 
relates closely to private companies and to restricted stocks. On the right side of the figure can be 
seen the value of discount for the lack of marketability to stockholders and premiums to be paid for 
controlling the company. Strategic Premiums could come into question if the company is purchased 
as a whole and/or synergies are gained in the merger. 
 
 
 
Strategic Value 
 
Control Value 
 
Freely Traded Value 
 
Nonmarketable Minority Value 
Strategic Premium/Merger Economies 
Control Premium 
Marketability Discount 
Source: Pratt et al. (2000, 348) 
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According to Kooli, Kortas et al. (2003), there are four different approaches to estimate the DLOM: 
the acquisition approach, the restricted stock approach, the expected exit multiple approach, and the 
IPO approach. In the following, I will discuss related literature to these four approaches to DLOM. 
 
3.1 ACQUISITION APPROACH 
 
The use of comparable publicly held corporations as a guide to valuation, as a 
practical matter, may be the most important and appropriate technique for valuing a 
privately held operating business. Obviously finding a business exactly the same as the 
enterprise to be valued is an impossibility. The standard sought is unusually one of 
reasonable and justifiable similarity. This degree of likeness is attainable in most 
cases. (Burke Jr. 1981, 49) 
 
As stated on the quote above, comparable companies valuation is indeed important technique for 
valuing a privately held companies, hence I find it also to be of the essence to study DLOM from 
the perspective where private companies are reflected to publicly traded ones.  
 
Acquisition approach estimates the marketability discount by comparing acquisition prices for 
public and private companies. Acquisition approach aims to identify a set of acquisitions of private 
companies and for each of these transactions to find an acquisition of similar publicly traded 
company. Meaning with similarity, the companies must (1) operate in the same industry, (2) close 
in size, and (3) acquired around the same time. After identifying the matching pairs the idea is to 
calculate the purchase price multiples of various relevant financial parameters, such as sales, EBIT, 
EBITDA, net operating profit after taxes (NOPAT), and assets. Later on, when all multiples have 
been calculated properly, the DLOM can be viewed by the difference between the multiples of 
publicly traded companies and privately held companies.  
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The equation to calculate DLOM from multiples can be shown as follows: 
 
 (8) 
      
 
where, 
DLOM = Discount for Lack of Marketability 
PrCM = Private Company Multiple 
PuCM = Public Company Multiple 
 
In this thesis, the intention is to use the acquisition approach to measure DLOM by gathering 
substantial data sample and then calculate mean and median multiples for both private and public 
companies. Table 2 presents an example of the idea how to calculate the mean and median 
multiples, in order to proceed into the final stage of measuring DLOM. 
Table 2 Acquisition approach to DLOM by using multiples 
This table illustrates the method using multiples to measure DLOM. In the table, there are six matching pairs (company 
data’s are illustrative), for which have been calculated four individual multiples. T. Price equals Transaction Price, 
P/NA is Transaction Price-to-Net Assets multiple, P/S is Transaction Price-to-Sales multiple, P/EBIT is Transaction 
Price-to-EBIT multiple, and P/EBITDA is Transaction Price-to-EBITDA multiple.  On the yellow area I have also 
calculated mean and median results in order to calculate DLOM using the equation (7) above. 
 
1 100 80 100 35 40 1.25 1.00 2.86 2.50
2 110 85 120 30 35 1.29 0.92 3.67 3.14
3 124 84 143 39 44 1.48 0.87 3.18 2.82
4 90 57 122 44 49 1.58 0.74 2.05 1.84
5 103 67 149 30 35 1.54 0.69 3.43 2.94
6 98 120 200 50 55 0.82 0.49 1.96 1.78
MEAN 1.33 0.78 2.86 2.50
MEDIAN 1.39 0.80 3.02 2.66
P/NA P/S P/EBIT P/EBITDA
Private  
Company T.  Price Net  Assets Sales EBIT EBITDA
1 125 92 120 37 42 1.36 1.04 3.38 2.98
2 140 98 144 32 37 1.43 0.97 4.38 3.78
3 150 97 172 41 46 1.55 0.87 3.66 3.26
4 155 66 146 46 51 2.35 1.06 3.37 3.04
5 170 77 179 32 37 2.21 0.95 5.31 4.59
6 200 138 240 53 58 1.45 0.83 3.77 3.45
MEAN 1.72 0.96 3.98 3.52
MEDIAN 1.50 0.96 3.72 3.35
P/NA P/S P/EBIT P/EBITDAEBITDA
Public 
Company T.  Price Net  Assets Sales EBIT
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3.2 RESTRICTED STOCK APPROACH 
 
Most of the public companies have some stock outstanding, or registered, but from various reasons 
restricted from public trading. When a company has an IPO, often much of these insiders’ stocks 
are not registered because the underwriters do not want the insiders to “bail out”. Unregistered 
stocks are frequently issued in acquisitions and private financings. Although this unregistered stock 
cannot be sold on the open market, it can be sold in private placements. The stock is identical in 
every way to the public traded stock except for the restrictions on its sale. Therefore, the concept of 
the restricted stock studies is to compare the private block sale prices of the restricted stock to the 
same-day public trading price, with the difference being a proxy for a discount for lack of 
marketability. (Pratt 2005, 156). During the past, there have been many researches concerning 
restricted stock and public stock transactions (see e.g. Bajaj, Denis et al. 2001, Hertzel and Smith 
1993, Silber 1991, Wruck 1989). These studies have included hundreds of transactions, covering a 
time scale from 1966 till the present time. The average discount ranges from 13% to 45%, with 
most clustered between 31% and 36% (Pratt 2001, 81). 
 
Chaffe (1993) presents an alternative way to calculate the DLOM of restricted stock. He looks 
DLOM from options point of view. Chaffe argues that if one holds restricted, non-marketable stock, 
and purchases an option to sell those shares at the market price, then the holder has, in effect, 
purchased marketability for the shares. Then the discount for DLOM would be the price of a put 
option (right to sell). A useful tool to define a price for put options is the Black & Scholes (1973) 
option-pricing model.  
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The Black & Sholes model has following formula: 
 
      (9) 
 
where 
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where,  
p = Put price 
X = Strike price 
r = Risk free interest rate 
T = Time to maturity 
N = Standard normal distribution 
S = Current price of the underlying asset 
V = Volatility 
 
The general usefulness of restricted stock studies has been questioned because investors in 
restricted stock are often institutional investors whose time horizon is long and need for liquidity is 
small. Moreover, the restricted stock researches rely on the discounts at which privately placed 
shares are sold as a measure of the marketability discount (Block 2007). However, marketability 
may not necessarily be the solely reason for discount. For example, venture capitalists and private 
equity investors often expect to provide the issuing company with special consulting, advice, and 
oversight following their purchase of privately placed shares. In these cases, at least part of the price 
discount observed in private equity placements may reflect compensation to investors for future 
services to be rendered, rather than a DLOM (Block 2007). 
 
3.3 EXPECTED EXIT MULTIPLE 
 
Expected exit multiple approach examines the private company discount from another perspective 
than the other three approaches presented in Chapter 3. This approach focuses on studying private 
 p  XerT N(d2) SN(d1)
 d2  d1 V T
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equity financing from venture capitalists and buyout funds point of view. The expected exit 
multiple approach aims to estimate the private company discount by comparing the valuation of the 
private company with the expected value at the liquidity event (Sarin, Das et al. 2002). Sarin, Das et 
al. (2002) argues that this approach also permits the appraisers to estimate the discount for 
companies in various stages of their growth cycle, industry, and at different points in time.   
 
The idea is fairly simple, since the private equity valuation discount is reflected in the extra rate of 
return required on the private firm over the return earned by investing in a public firm (Sarin, Das et 
al. 2002). The risks of investing into a private company are much higher than investing into a 
publicly traded marketable firm. Therefore, the required rate of return is higher than it would be 
with similar public company. 
 
Startup companies, as well as expanding companies, often need an outside source of financing to 
provide the critical resources to survive and grow. It is typical that these companies go through 
different stages of funding over the course of its lifecycle. According to Dean and Giglierano 
(1990), there are five stages of venture financing; (1) founders’ round, (2) seed round, (3) second 
stage, (4) mezzanine stage, and (5) IPO.  Sarin, Das et al. (2002) categorized each financing rounds 
in their study into five categories based on the stage of the firm that was being financed: early-stage, 
expansion stage, later-stage, buyout/acquisitions stage and others. They investigated over 52.000 
rounds of financing, over the period of 1980 to 2000, and followed each of these investments and 
estimated  the  probability  of  the  companies  being  acquired,  or  having  an  IPO.  The  probability  of  
exiting via IPO was roughly 20-25% and was fairly constant for companies financed in an early 
stage, expansion stage, or later stage. Equally, they found that exiting via acquisition was 
approximately 10-20% and the probability of an acquisition was much higher for companies 
financed in later stages. Therefore, the total probability of exit lies in the range of 30-45%.  
 
Venture capitalists take voluntarily substantial risks by investing into companies where exit and 
maturity  date  is  unknown.  Therefore,  they  tend  to  think  their  initial  investment  more  in  terms  of  
multiples, rather than in terms of steady, annual rates of return. Hence, part of the value creation 
comes from the venture capitalists ability to negotiate discounted price. To estimate the expected 
exit multiples and discounts, Sarin, Das et al. (2002) capture the multiples and concomitant 
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discounts that the private equity purchasers get on their investments relative to the expected value at 
the exit. 
 
Firstly,  the  equation  of  how  to  define  the  exit  multiple  will  be  presented,  and  secondly,  more  
complicated version of it, the expected exit multiple equation. 
  
              (10) 
 
 
where, 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
This equation is widely used by venture capitalists since it assesses the payback ratio of the initial 
investment. The excess return to investor is the difference between Xraw and Xind.  Sarin,  Das et  al.  
(2002) found that the multiples for acquired firms are usually lower than those for IPO. Average 
multiples varied from 10 for early stage companies to 4.6 for later stage companies.  
 
As mentioned earlier, estimating expected exit multiple is more complicated than calculating the 
exit multiple with equation (9). First we need to calculate two different multiples from the data 
sample, the expected exit multiple in year t and the expected exit multiple in industry k.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exit multiple X raw
X ind
 
X raw  
Exit Valuation (at IPO or Acquisition)
Financing Valuation
 
X ind  
Industry Index (at IPO or Acquisition)
Industry Index at Financing
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The equations to calculate expected exit multiples are as follows: 
(11) 
 
 
where, 
  
j = Stage of the company 
t = Year of financing 
p = Probability of an IPO or Acquisition 
i = ith multiple 
Njt = Number of financing in stage j in year t 
and 
(12) 
 
 
 
where 
k = Industry 
 
Note that the expected exit multiple is an equally weighted multiple.  
 
Finally, as we can define the expected exit multiple, Sarin, Das et al. (2002) have provided a 
guideline to estimate the appropriate amount of marketability discount by using the following 
equations:  
            (13) 
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 Expected Exit Multiple jt  E X jt IPO or Acquisition 
 p j,t IPO or Acquisition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3.4 IPO APPROACH 
 
Another widely used approach to study private company discounts is the IPO approach. The IPO 
approach attempts to quantify the discount associated by comparing the post-IPO share prices with 
transaction prices in the same shares prior to the IPO. John D. Emory  has done numerous studies 
(1994, 1997, 2000, and 2002) about the value of marketability using the IPO approach. Emory’s 
initial thought in year 1980 was that if the prices, at which private transactions took place before the 
IPO, could be related to the price, at which the stock was offered subsequently to the public, another 
gauge as to the magnitude of the value of marketability might be available. Indeed, it is possible to 
establish the prices due to a prospectus is obliged to identify securities transactions between 
principals and insiders, since the registrants last fiscal year prior to the offering. In order to provide 
a reasonable comparison of prices before and at the IPO, Emory felt necessary both for the 
company to have been reasonably sound and for the private transaction to have occurred within a 
period of five months prior to the offering date. In eight of his studies, over 2.200 prospectuses were 
reviewed and 310 qualifying transactions were found. The mean discount for the 310 transactions, 
in eight studies was 44% and the median was 43% (Emory 1997). In Emory’s latest study, where he 
has expanded the time frame from the previous 1980-1997 to 1980-2002, 543 qualifying 
transactions were found. The mean discount for the 543 transactions was 46% and the median was 
47% (Emory Sr., Dengel III et al. 2002). 
 
However, these studies suffer from several problems. Koeplin, Sarin et al. (2000, 96) states that the 
transactions used are with insiders and are generally not arm’s length. One way to see it, would be 
management compensation plans, which are build in a way that enables managers to buy these 
stocks below fair value or market value. Secondly Koeplin, Sarin et al. (2000, 96) argue that most 
of the transactions observed are for restricted options issued to management and do not represent an 
exchange of shares for cash. Finally, Emory’s studies suffer from a serious selection bias. Studied 
companies represent only the better half of an apple and therefore the sample does not include any 
“unsuccessful” companies. An obvious reason for this is that no investor wants to purchase stocks 
of a company that has no potential, and that is why only good companies go public. 
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4 HYPOTHESES 
 
The goal of this study is to measure the average private company discount in merger situations and 
to find generalizable answers to the question of what is causing this phenomenon. Hence, I am 
using only U.S.-based companies, I believe the results are generalizable due to a fairly large sample 
size and a variety of companies involved.  
 
Prior studies on private company discounts have derived broad range of results. Studies conducted 
using the restricted stock approach, Hertzel and Smith (1993) found an average discount of 13.5%, 
Wruck (1989) found 17.6%, and Silber (1991) found an average of 33.75%. Using the IPO 
approach with a sample of 543 transactions and covering the years 1980-2002, Emory Sr., Dengel 
III et al. (2002) found a staggering average discount of 46% for private companies prior to an IPO. 
Using the expected exit multiples method, Sarin, Das et al. (2002) found that financing in late stage 
companies leads to private equity discounts of approximately 11% and for early stage companies 
the discounts are as high as 80%. Finally, the acquisition approach studies made by Kooli, Kortas et 
al. (2003), Koeplin, Sarin et al. (2000) and Block (Block 2007) resulted discounts of approximately 
34%, 25% and 17%, respectively. As can be noticed, the results are dispersed into a broad range, 
however, all of these studies report a significant discount for private companies. 
 
Based on previous researches I set the first hypothesis to analyze the topic as follows: 
 
H1: On average privately held companies sell at discount to comparable public targets. 
  
Acquirers may benefit from the discount applied on private companies on merger situations. After 
testing the H1 hypothesis, the next phase is to examine whether the transaction price differences of 
private and public companies can be explained with firm-specific and industry-specific factors 
related to company status, company size, earning power, capital adequacy, industry, and/or 
acquisition date. Therefore, I present the following hypotheses: 
 
H2: The possible discount between private companies and public companies can be explained by 
the status the company represents. 
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H3A: The possible transaction price difference between private and public companies can be 
explained by the size of a company. 
 
H3B: The possible transaction price difference between private and public companies can be 
explained by the performance of a company. 
 
H3C: The possible transaction price difference between private and public companies can be 
explained by the amount of debt a company has. 
 
H3D: The possible transaction price difference between private and public companies can be 
explained by the industry in which a company operates. 
 
H3E: The possible transaction price difference between private and public companies can be 
explained by the time when a company is acquired. 
 
H4A: The possible discounts of which private companies suffer can be explained by the size of a 
company. 
 
H4B: The possible discounts of which private companies suffer can be explained by the performance 
of a company 
 
H4C: The possible discounts of which private companies suffer can be explained by the amount of 
debt a company has. 
 
H4D: The possible discounts of which private companies suffer can be explained by the industry in 
which a company operates. 
 
H4E: The possible discounts of which private companies suffer can be explained by the time when a 
company is acquired. 
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5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This chapter presents the sample description, variables definition and methodology used in this 
thesis. This chapter gives a detailed description of how the data was obtained and the variables 
chosen. Finally, the methodology used in this thesis and the methodology used in the previous 
studies will be discussed. 
 
5.1 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
 
The initial sample consisted of astonishing 158,453 mergers and acquisitions over the 20-year 
period  between  1989  and  2008.  The  sample  was  extracted  from  SDC  Platinum  database  and  
includes all U.S.-based transactions between the years 1989-2008. SDC Platinum database includes 
corporate finance related data concerning global new issues, M&A, corporate governance, corporate 
restructuring, securities trading, industry specific, and public finance dated back to the year 1962 
(M&A 1979 - present). All firm-specific information is obtained from this database and no 
adjustments have been made to it.  
 
The sample contains all U.S. SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) code categories, except 
Finance and Insurance, and Public Administration. From the initial sample, there were found 30,608 
transactions classified to be public- and 76,439 transactions classified to be private, with 931 
different SIC. After the transaction was required to have deal value, the number of hits reduced to 
25,633 public- and 24,728 private acquisitions. The deal status was chosen to be completed and 
unconditional, which decreased the number of public hits to 12,919 and private to 21,519. Finally, 
the deal type was chosen as “disclosed value mergers & acquisitions”, which led the sample to 
consist of 5,815 public- and 19,779 private transactions. Moreover, in order to get net sales, net 
assets,  EBIT,  and  EBITDA  from  the  last  12  months,  the  sample  had  to  be  sorted,  which  further  
decreased it to have 4,093 public companies and only 1,556 private companies. All in all, the 
sample ended up including a grand total of 5,649 U.S.-based transactions over the 20-year period 
between 1.1.1989 and 31.12.2008. The following two tables (Table 3 and Table 4) summarize the 
data gathering process from SDC Platinum database, before the final manual sorting procedure. 
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Table 3 SDC-session details concerning public companies 
The  table  shows  the  criteria’s  of  how  the  sample  of  5,815  public  U.S.-based  mergers  and  acquisitions,  over  a  time  
period between 1.1.1989 and 31.12.2008, was gathered. The first column lists the number of request, the second column 
points the number of hits found for each additional request, and the third column briefly describes the request in 
question. This sample was further sorted to exclude all the companies lacking the information on net sales, net assets, 
EBIT, and EBITDA. Finally the sample consisted of 4,093 public companies. 
Request Number of hits Request description 
0 - DATABASES: U.S. (domestic) M&A, 1979-present (MA, OMA) 
1 - Date announced: 01/01/1989 to 31/12/2008 (Custom) 
2 158 453 Target All SIC: Finance & Insurance and Public. Admin. excluded 
3 158 450 Target Nation: U.S. 
4 30 608 Target Public Status: Public 
5 25 633 Deal Value: LO to HIGH 
6 12 919 Deal Status: Completed and unconditional 
7 5 815 Deal type: Disclosed Value Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
Table 4 SDC-session details concerning private companies 
The table is identical with Table 3, except it presents the criteria’s of how the sample of 19,779 private U.S.-based 
mergers and acquisitions was gathered.  
Request Number of hits Request description 
0 - DATABASES: U.S. (domestic) M&A, 1979-present (MA, OMA) 
1 - Date announced: 01/01/1989 to 31/12/2008 (Custom) 
2 158 453 Target All SIC: Finance & Insurance and Public. Admin. excluded 
3 158 450 Target Nation: U.S. 
4 76 439 Target Public Status: Private 
5 24 728 Deal Value: LO to HIGH 
6 21 519 Deal Status: Completed and unconditional 
7 19 779 Deal type: Disclosed Value Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
After data gathering, started the actual sorting in order to find the matching pairs. The objective was 
to  find  as  similar  transactions  as  possible,  from  both  groups  -  private  and  public.  The  following  
criteria’s was chosen to define the final number of matching pairs. 
 
Firstly, all the acquisitions used in this study were acquired for 100 per cent of shares outstanding, 
since the examination of minority interests would require another study. Secondly, the focus was on 
the primary four-digit SIC code, as these codes had to be exactly the same for both companies. 
Thirdly, the date when the transaction of private company took place had to be within 12 months 
(plus or minus) with the public company in question. Fourthly, the size of net assets of private 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49
company had to be within 20 per cent (plus or minus) with the public company in question. This led 
to a grand total of 242 companies matching with these three criteria’s, in other words 121 pairs. The 
following figure (Figure 3) describes the yearly distributions of the matching pairs.  
 
Figure 3 Timely distributions of acquisitions among the chosen companies 
This figure illustrates the distribution of acquisitions between the timescale of 1989 and 2008. As can be seen, it is clear 
that the years 2000 and 2001 had the most acquisitions, possibly due to the dot-com boom. 
  
5.2 VARIABLE DEFINITION 
 
Appendix 1 presents a detailed definition of all the independent and dependent variables used in 
generating the multiples to calculate the discount and applied to the regression models. Koeplin, 
Sarin et al. (2000) are guided in the choice of valuation ratios by the valuation basics discussed 
previously in the literature review. They chose ratios that can be applied to private as well as public 
companies, and therefore avoid using market-based variables. The variables for calculating the 
valuation multiples based discount are for the most part the same as Koeplin, Sarin et al. (2000) 
uses, except in this thesis the transaction value will be applied as a numerator instead of enterprise 
value. Koeplin, Sarin et al. (2000) uses enterprise value to judge the appropriateness of the price 
paid, hence in this thesis the purpose is not to judge whether the price paid was appropriate or not, 
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but to study already realized transaction. In their calculations, enterprise value is defined by 
multiplying the shares outstanding by the offer price and then by adding convertible securities, 
short-term debt, straight debt, preferred equity, minus cash and marketable securities. Next, the 
valuation multiples and all the dependent and independent variables are presented. 
 
Valuation multiples: 
  
Transaction Price-to-Net Assets – This  multiple  indicates  the  ratio  of  the  price  paid  against  the  
book value of equity. The letters PNA is short for Transaction Price-to-Net Assets. 
 
Transaction Price-to-Sales –  This  multiple  indicates  the  ratio  of  what  the  acquirer  paid  against  
each dollar of acquired company’s sales. The letters PSA is short for Transaction Price-to-Sales. 
 
Transaction Price-to-EBIT – The EBIT variable is  a measure of performance, and therefore this 
multiple shows the amount what the acquirer paid against acquired company’s last twelve month’s 
performance. The letters PEBIT is short for Transaction Price-to-EBIT. 
 
Transaction Price-to-EBITDA – This multiple is same as previous one, except that into the EBIT 
variable, depreciation and amortization are added back. The letters PEBITDA is short for 
Transaction Price-to-EBITDA. 
 
Furthermore, there are various additional variables that will be used when measuring correlation 
coefficients and applying the three multiple linear regression models. Net assets (short for NA) 
divide all of the dependent variables and independent variables related to size, performance, and 
risk. Hence, the differences among the companies are taken into account.  
 
Dependent variables: 
 
Transaction Price – This variable is  the transaction price-to-net assets ratio.  The letter P is  short  
for Transaction Price.  
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Transaction Priceprivate – Transaction Pricepublic – This variable is an empirical measure of the 
differences between the transaction prices of a private and a public peer company.  
 
(Transaction Priceprivate – Transaction Pricepublic) <0 – This variable concentrates on those 
individual private companies, whose price-to-net assets ratio is smaller relative to a public peer 
company.  
 
Independent size-, performance-, and risk variables: 
 
Net Assets – This  variable  is  an  empirical  measure  for  the  size  of  a  company.  Net  assets  are  the  
difference  between total  assets  and  total  liabilities.  Net  assets  are  based  on  the  information  at  the  
time of acquisition. The letters NA is short for net assets. 
 
1/Net Assets – This variable is a reciprocal of net assets. In order to use net assets as a measure of 
company’s size, this conversion is needed, since the net assets divide the dependent variables. With 
this, the differences in the transaction price are taken into account. Net assets are based on the 
information at the time of acquisition. 1/NA is short for the reciprocal of net assets. 
 
Sales – This variable is an empirical measure for the size of a company. Sales are based on the last 
twelve months information prior to acquisition. 
 
EBITDA – This variable is an empirical measure for the performance of a company. EBITDA is an 
important measure of performance, since it takes into account companies’ different depreciation and 
amortization methods. EBITDA is based on the last twelve months information prior to acquisition. 
  
Net Debt – This variable is an empirical measure of company’s risk. Net debt is derived from total 
debt deducted with cash and cash equivalents. Net debt is based on the information at the time of 
acquisition. The letters ND is short for net debt. 
 
Salesprivate – Salespublic – This variable is an empirical measure of the differences between the sales 
of a private and a public peer company. The letter S is short for sales.  
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EBITDAprivate – EBITDApublic – This variable is an empirical measure of the differences between 
the performance of a private and a public peer company. 
 
Net Debtprivate – Net Debtpublic – This variable is an empirical measure of the differences between 
the riskiness of a private and a public peer company.  
  
Independent company status-, industry-, and acquisition time variables: 
 
Private – This variable is an indicator variable. It is 1 if the company status is private, otherwise 0. 
 
Industry 1 – This variable is an indicator variable. It is 1 if the company’s SIC-code is between 
1000 and 1499, otherwise 0. All of the companies are grouped into eleven categories based on the 
SIC-codes (see Appendix 2A). For the remaining ten industry variables, the indications are made 
similarly. The letters IND is short for industry. 
  
Year 1 – This variable is an indicator variable. It is 1 if the company was acquired in the year 2008 
or 2007, otherwise 0. All of the acquisitions are grouped into ten categories based on the acquisition 
date (see Appendix 2B). For the remaining nine acquisition year variables, the indications are made 
similarly. The letters YO is short for year. 
 
5.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology is divided into two parts. Firstly, I will compare the acquisitions of private and 
public targets by comparing the chosen variables described earlier. The objective is to measure the 
differences of valuation ratios between private and public targets. Hopefully, these calculations will 
generate answers where private company discounts exist and the full extent of it. The multiples I 
use will generate four different indicators of discount or premium, applied to the sample’s 242 
acquisitions.  
 
Secondly, I examine with three multiple linear regression models, whether or not there can be found 
explanatory factors, which are causing discounts (premiums paid) in acquisitions. Before applying 
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regression models, I will find out the correlation coefficients between the transaction price and 
other independent variables. I will be using Pearson’s correlation and Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficients and will apply these for both set of acquisitions. Furthermore, all the variables, except 
company status, industry and acquisition time are divided by Net Assets, in order to scale all the 
companies and rule out the size factor. Scaled variables will also be used in the regression models 
as stated before.  
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6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter, the empirical results of the study are presented. The main purpose of the analysis in 
this chapter is to determine the differences in the multiples between private and public companies, 
and further to determine the possible discounts and explanatory factors behind this. I begin with 
descriptive statistics and continue to present the correlation coefficients between the transaction 
price and other dependent variables for both sets of companies.  
 
Next, the calculations and the obtained results are presented, using the multiples valuation method. 
After this part, I will then concentrate on examining the differences between the private and public 
target multiples, industries and acquisition time. Three different multiple linear regression models 
are applied, in order to find causal relationships between the dependent variables and independent 
variables. Each of the regression models are described comprehensively in the Chapter 6.4 
Regression Analysis  
  
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the variables chosen to multiples valuation and two 
additional variables measuring the risks of companies. This table reveals some interesting facts 
about the companies involved. Value of transaction, on average, was larger with public companies, 
however the median figure was higher in private companies. Net sales could be stated to be fairly 
equal on both categories, on average, private category has the upper hand; higher median figure 
goes to public category. The latter statement also applies to net assets, except the parts have turned 
to opposite. The most interesting part was the moment when EBIT from the last twelve month 
(LTM) was revealed. As can be seen, the average and the median EBIT for public companies are 
both negative (-4.8 and -0.9 respectively). The factors behind these results remain unknown. What 
makes it interesting is that EBIT should reflect company’s financial performance and with these 
figures, one could argue that negative EBIT could affect acquirers desire to purchase such a 
company. One reasonable answer could be that these companies are executing some sort of tax 
planning for future benefits. Furthermore, when depreciation and amortization are added back to 
EBIT, the EBITDA on average ends up being positive for public companies; hence the median 
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remains slightly negative. Private companies outplay public ones on both measures, EBIT and 
EBITDA.  Finally,  the  figures  reflecting  risks  reveals  that,  median  and  on  average,  total  debt  for  
public companies are higher. When cash and cash equivalents, in other words liquid assets are 
deducted from total debt, the positions turn the other way around. This implies that on average 
public companies hold more liquid assets than private ones, based on the net debt. Lastly, the mean 
and median figures do not match quite well, which can be explained due to high standard deviations 
(Std.). High standard deviation indicates the observations are fractioned into a wide scale. 
 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics of sample transactions 
This table captures the differences between the 242 private and public companies. 
 
 
 
In addition, the industry distributions are presented in Appendix 3. 
 
6.2 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE DEPENDENT AND THE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
Correlation analysis is a univariate test, which is set to measure the dependences between two or 
more variables. Correlation analysis is particularly useful since it can give predictive relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables. However, correlation analysis does not provide 
information whether the dependent and the independent variables are causally related. Causal 
relationships will be studied with regression models. Another important purpose is to test whether 
the independent variables are mutually correlated in case, which would cause multicollinearity 
problems in the regression analysis phase. 
 
Mean Median Std. Min Max Mean Median Std. Min Max
Value of Transaction ($mil) 178.3 74.1 405.9 0.4 4094 202.0 50.5 519.8 0.6 4465
Net Assets ($mil) 29.5 11.7 41.8 0.5 230.2 29.7 11.2 41.9 0.6 210.6
Net Sales LTM ($mil) 66.9 23.7 113.3 0.1 707.5 59.6 24.5 105.4 1.6 697.2
EBIT LTM ($mil) 3.3 0.8 26.8 -143.4 166.2 -4.8 -0.9 28.1 -210.4 115.7
EBITDA LTM ($mil) 7.2 1.9 26.8 -121.9 148.0 1.5 -0.2 27.9 -144.3 163.5
Total Debt ($mil) * 20.2 2.2 49.1 0.01 271.1 25.7 2.8 81.0 0.01 448.1
Net Debt ($mil) 13.7 0.9 55.1 -139.2 288.3 1.2 -1.1 69.7 -184.4 442.4
* Data not available for 28 private- and 37 public companies
Private Public
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Table 6 and Table 7 present the correlation matrix of the variables for both groups of acquisitions, 
private and public. The Pearson correlations are presented below the diagonal and the Spearman 
rank correlations are above the diagonal. The nominal scale indicator variables are not included into 
the correlation matrix. This is not advised since the Pearson correlation assumes the variables to be 
interval  scale  and  Spearman  rank  correlation  requires  that  the  variables  are  at  least  ordinal  scale  
(Ghauri and Grønhaug 2005, 181). However, indicator variables are applied into the regression 
models and therefore correlation coefficients are stated to indicator variables in Appendixes 4 and 
5. Correlations between indicator variables and dependent variable are not presented in the 
correlation matrixes (Table 6 and 7), due to the large amount of it. Nonetheless, possible significant 
correlations between indicator variables and dependent variable are presented in the chapters 6.2.1 
and 6.2.2. 
 
6.2.1 Correlation coefficients of private acquisitions 
 
Pearson correlations measured for private companies, sales (SNA), net debt (NDNA), and 
acquisition year 2000 (YO_6) are positively and significantly correlated with transaction price 
(PNA). Acquisition years 2003 and 2002 (YO_4) correlates negatively with transaction price. The 
results gathered from Spearman rank correlation prove evidence that net assets (1/NA), sales,  and 
acquisition year 2000 are positively and significantly correlated with transaction price. 
Interestingly, company’s performance (EBITDANA) has no significant correlation with transaction 
price. Moreover, as could be expected sales correlate positively and significantly with EBITDA, 
where net debt correlate negatively and significantly with EBITDA.  
 
Pearson correlation and Spearman rank correlation provide evidence that independent variables are 
not too powerfully mutually correlated. The highest Spearman rank correlation is indeed between 
sales and EBITDA (0.511). Lind, Marchal et al. (2010, 528) suggest that if the correlation between 
two independent variables is between -0.70 and 0.70 there likely will not appear multicollinearity 
problems when applying regression models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57
Table 6 Correlation between estimation variables of private acquisitions 
This table presents the correlation coefficients between the dependent variable and the independent variables for the 
private companies acquired. PNA is the transaction price divided by net assets of the particular company, 1/NA is a 
reciprocal of net assets, SNA is sales divided by net assets, EBITDANA is EBITDA divided by net assets, and NDNA is 
net debt divided by net assets. Pearson correlation coefficients are presented below the diagonal and the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients are above the diagonal. Correlation coefficients with significance level of 5% (0.05) and greater 
are bolded. P-values are reported in parenthesis. Correlations for all independent variables, see Appendix 4. 
  
 
 
 
 
6.2.2 Correlation coefficients of public acquisitions 
 
Pearson correlations measured for private companies indicated that sales (SNA), net debt (NDNA), 
and acquisition year 2000 (YO_6) was positively and significantly correlated with transaction price 
(PNA). Results for public companies present some similarities, since sales and acquisition year 
2000 are positively and significantly correlated with transaction price. In addition to these, the 
reciprocal of net assets (1/NA) seem to correlate positively and significantly with transaction price.  
 
The results gathered from Spearman rank correlation proves evidence that only sales are positively 
and significantly correlated with transaction price. However, industry wholesale and retail trade 
(IND_4), acquisition years 2003 and 2002 (YO_4), as well as acquisition years 1992, 1991, 1990 
and 1989 (YO_10) are negatively and significantly correlated with transaction price. Moreover, 
again it is interesting to find out that company’s performance (EBITDANA) has no significant 
correlation with transaction price. According to these preliminary results, net debt does not seem to 
correlate with transaction price, however, we cannot argue based on these results that there is a 
PNA 1/NA SNA EBITDANA NDNA
PNA 0.260 0.344 0.164 0.087
(0.004) (0.000) (0.072) (0.341)
1/NA 0.105 0.284 -0.082 0.081
(0.252) (0.002) (0.373) (0.375)
SNA 0.297 0.181 0.511 -0.011
(0.001) (0.047) (0.000) (0.908)
EBITDANA 0.088 -0.035 0.182 -0.241
(0.335) (0.706) (0.046) (0.008)
NDNA 0.288 -0.009 0.108 -0.239
(0.001) (0.921) (0.239) (0.008)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58
causal relationship. As mentioned earlier, regression models will be applied later on to provide 
information whether causal relationships between variables appear to be. 
 
Also for public acquisitions, Pearson correlation and Spearman rank correlation provide evidence 
that independent variables are not too powerfully mutually correlated. The highest Spearman rank 
correlation is between sales and reciprocal of net assets (0.581). 
 
Table 7 Correlation between estimation variables of public acquisitions 
This table presents the correlation coefficients between the dependent variable and the independent variables for the 
private companies acquired. PNA is the transaction price divided by net assets of the particular company, 1/NA is a 
reciprocal of net assets, SNA is sales divided by net assets, EBITDANA is EBITDA divided by net assets, and NDNA is 
net debt divided by net assets. Pearson correlation coefficients are presented below the diagonal and the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients are above the diagonal. Correlation coefficients with significance level of 5% (0.05) and greater 
are bolded. P-values are reported in parenthesis. Correlations for all independent variables, see Appendix 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3 MULTIPLES VALUATION ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter I will present the obtained results from multiples valuation. Multiples valuation 
method was used to produce answers whether private companies suffer from DLOM or not. I 
analyzed all 242 acquisitions and calculated four valuation multiples based on companies size 
(sales- and net asset multiples) and performance (EBIT- and EBITDA multiples). This method is 
mainly based on previous similar type of studies conducted by Kooli, Kortas et al. (2003), Koeplin, 
Sarin et al. (2000) and Block (2007). Additionally, the valuation multiples of private targets 
PNA 1/NA SNA EBITDANA NDNA
PNA 0.171 0.288 0.012 -0.093
(0.060) (0.001) (0.900) (0.309)
1/NA 0.318 0.581 -0.258 -0.012
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.895)
SNA 0.414 0.331 0.027 0.069
(0.000) (0.000) (0.770) (0.455)
EBITDANA 0.155 -0.378 0.021 0.218
(0.090) (0.000) (0.817) (0.016)
NDNA -0.115 -0.175 -0.162 0.153
(0.210) (0.054) (0.076) (0.093)
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associated with industry classifications and acquisition times are compared to the sample including 
public targets’ mean and median valuations. The results are presented in three parts. In the first part 
the private company discount (premium) is measured by comparing the valuation multiples of 
private targets to public targets. This is the most important part in order to reveal whether the 
private company discount phenomena actually exist or not. In the second part, the extent of the 
discount (premium) based on industry classifications, for eleven different industries are presented. 
In the third and final part, the amount of discount (premium) based on acquisition times is revealed. 
  
Results associated with industry classifications (Table 9) and acquisition times (Table 10) gives 
predictive indications of whether these two variables can cause the private companies to sell at a 
discount, or not. However, the results obtained here are not sufficient to conclude the suggestion 
that industries and/or acquisition times are causally related to private company transaction price. 
Hence, in the regression phase these two variables are tested in order to find causal relationships. 
 
Findings reported in Table 8 indicate that on average public company valuations are on a higher 
level, measured by these four valuation multiples. The results, however, are not statistically 
significant, measured by t-test. The average discount for private targets ranges from 13.2% (Price-
to-EBIT) to 28.7% (Price-to-EBITDA). However, where all average multiples yields answers 
leading to discounts, median price-to-Net assets and price-to-Sales produces quite heavy premiums, 
35.1% and 50.5% respectively. Additionally, each of the median multiples is statistically 
significant, measured by the Wilcoxon’s matched-pairs signed rank test.  
 
The results presented in Table 8 are somewhat controversial from what was to be expected initially. 
Average multiples present private company discounts, although the figures are not statistically 
significant.  Median multiples in the other hand present both discounts,  as well  as hefty premiums 
for private companies and these figures are statistically significant. To conclude, the statement 
whether private company discounts occur or not, differs based on what multiple are we looking at. 
However, it is safe to say that private company valuation differs drastically from public companies. 
Furthermore, based on the average multiples, it is justified to say that at this point the hypothesis H1 
holds. 
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Table 8 Multiples Valuation, Discounts and Premiums 
This table presents the mean and median valuation multiples, as well as minimum and maximum figures for all 121 
acquisition pairs. Valuation multiples are further on used to calculate the private company discounts (premiums) for 
lack of marketability. Private company discount is calculated as: 1 – (Private Company Multiple / Public Company 
Multiple) 
 
 
 
Results presented in Table 9 suggest that nine out of eleven industries appear to have at least six out 
of eight of the average and median valuation multiples below the benchmark public value. Only the 
industries Transportation and Computer Related Services & Business Services appear to outperform 
each corresponding public multiple. Therefore, predictive indications show that private companies 
in these nine industries have been sold at a discount, compared to an average or median 
corresponding public peer company. Additionally, this suggests that private companies in 
Transportation and Computer Related Services & Business Services have been acquired at a 
premium, compared to an average or a median public company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Median Min Max Std. Mean Median Min Max Std. Mean Median
Price-to-Net Assets 9.4 4.9 0.1 56.3 11.3 11.1 3.6 0.4 177.8 24.2 15.2% -35.1% **
Price-to-Sales 8.3 2.9 0.0 110.7 17.0 10.0 1.9 0.0 288.4 36.3 17.3% -50.5% ***
Price-to-EBIT 1) 24.7 13.4 0.9 326.7 43.4 28.4 17.3 3.5 159.1 29.8 13.2% 22.6% **
Price-to-EBITDA 2) 21.7 10.4 0.7 184.4 31.4 30.4 12.5 1.9 587.5 78.8 28.7% 17.2% **
1) 53 private companies and 73 public companies excluded due to negative EBIT.
2) 40 private companies and 65 public companies excluded due to negative EBITDA.
*** and ** denote statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.
Private Public DISCOUNT
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Table 9 Valuation multiples associated to industry classifications 
This table presents the extent of discount, associated to eleven different industries and to four different valuation 
multiples. PNA is Transaction price-to-Net assets, PSA is Transaction price-to-Sales, PEBIT is Transaction price-to-
EBIT, and PEBITDA is Transaction price-to-EBITDA. 
 
 
 
Table 10, where the acquisition years are associated to four valuation multiples, shows that seven 
acquisition year categories appear to have at least six out of eight of the average and median 
valuation multiples below the corresponding public benchmark. These acquisition time categories 
include the years from 1989 to 1999, 2001, and the years from 2004 to 2008. Predictive indications 
show that private companies acquired during these years have been sold at a discount, compared to 
an average or median public peer company. Furthermore, the results show that three acquisition 
year categories appear to have at least six out of eight of the mean and median multiples above the 
public benchmark figure. During the year 2000 and the years from 2002 to 2005, the results suggest 
that private companies have been acquired at a premium, compared to an average or a median 
public company. 
Table 10 Valuation multiples of private companies associated to acquisition year 
This table presents the extent of discount, associated to ten different acquisition time categories and to four different 
valuation multiples. PNA is Transaction price-to-Net assets, PSA is Transaction price-to-Sales, PEBIT is Transaction 
price-to-EBIT, and PEBITDA is Transaction price-to-EBITDA. 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Mining 3.5 2.8 17.7 2.2 4.6 4.1 5.1 2.8 25.1 13.4 32.5 11.3 12.1 8.0 19.6 4.9
Manufacturing 10.7 4.3 6.2 3.1 5.0 1.8 12.6 2.0 16.8 10.5 29.4 14.1 12.1 7.4 50.2 15.3
Transportation 128.3 3.7 6.7 5.0 25.0 4.8 2.2 2.7 128.3 30.1 23.9 25.8 24.8 17.7 12.0 14.1
Wholesale & Retail Trade 3.5 3.5 1.5 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.2 15.3 11.4 25.5 25.5 9.2 8.6 21.0 21.0
Business Services 13.4 10.1 23.2 5.0 10.6 3.5 2.9 2.0 10.5 10.5 17.3 17.3 54.7 11.1 9.7 12.6
Prepacked Software 10.8 8.0 13.3 4.0 12.8 3.9 15.6 1.8 17.6 17.6 23.3 28.2 31.5 16.5 34.9 23.2
Computer Integrated Systems Design 6.8 4.6 6.4 4.3 1.9 0.8 2.8 1.8 33.0 11.8 31.7 37.7 26.7 12.9 19.3 19.5
Computer Retrieval Services 15.7 9.0 25.8 10.8 10.0 6.6 10.3 2.1 22.4 22.4 98.2 98.2 9.2 9.2 16.0 16.0
Computer Related Services & Business Services 14.4 12.2 2.9 1.7 4.7 3.8 0.6 0.7 27.3 20.7 10.0 10.0 21.8 19.8 7.1 7.1
Health Services 5.7 6.0 4.6 4.3 1.7 1.5 4.1 1.9 9.1 9.1 19.4 19.4 40.3 10.0 14.5 14.5
Engineering & Management Services 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.0 0.6 0.6 1.2 1.2 19.7 19.7 - - 7.0 7.0 - -
PUBLIC
PEBITDAPSA PEBITPNA PSA PEBIT PEBITDA
PRIVATE
PNA
PUBLIC PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATEPUBLIC PUBLIC
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Years 2008, 2007 9.4 7.1 8.5 5.5 5.3 2.1 3.3 2.1 72.8 28.8 41.6 36.8 14.7 12.9 20.3 19.2
Year 2006 11.9 4.8 4.8 4.1 4.6 4.1 19.4 1.5 17.2 10.3 32.4 28.0 19.6 10.3 41.5 17.0
Years 2005, 2004 16.1 8.5 10.2 5.0 3.5 2.5 2.1 1.9 28.2 11.4 14.7 14.7 52.9 21.8 10.3 12.4
Years 2003, 2002 4.3 4.3 10.0 2.5 5.3 3.2 2.3 1.4 26.1 16.8 17.4 12.5 14.2 10.8 16.5 7.2
Year 2001 6.3 3.3 11.1 3.4 12.9 5.1 2.9 2.4 17.1 14.0 17.8 6.4 17.4 12.2 16.9 7.9
Year 2000 17.7 14.3 15.9 4.9 27.4 8.1 36.6 2.2 19.7 20.7 12.3 12.3 13.2 14.1 9.8 9.8
Year 1999 8.2 4.3 12.9 4.1 5.5 2.4 13.3 5.8 44.2 19.1 32.0 32.0 49.5 23.4 304.6 304.6
Years 1998, 1997 1.4 5.3 1.4 4.1 1.4 1.0 3.4 1.2 17.3 17.9 44.4 25.5 27.1 15.2 31.5 19.7
Years 1996, 1995, 1994, 1993 6.3 5.9 10.8 3.0 1.5 1.4 2.5 2.3 13.6 10.8 23.4 20.5 17.1 8.2 15.7 12.9
Years 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989 5.5 3.5 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.3 11.5 7.8 36.2 19.7 7.5 6.9 12.3 7.5
PUBLIC
PEBITDAPSA PEBITPNA PSA PEBIT PEBITDA
PRIVATE
PNA
PUBLIC PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATEPUBLIC PUBLIC
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These results presented here are somewhat in line with previous studies. Block (2007) found that 
companies in Manufacturing industry suffer higher price discounts than other industries on average. 
Block also argues that Finance companies on average are valued higher than companies in other 
industries. In this study financial companies are excluded due to their unorthodox balance sheet 
structure (highly liquid assets). Compared to the acquisition time, Kooli, Kortas et al. (2003) argues 
similarly that acquisition year 2001, measured by median discount has been worse than the other 
years and the year 1999 has been better than the other years in the sample.  
 
Multiples valuation method is insufficient to determine causal relationship between the variables, 
although it gives suggestive assumptions, and therefore regression analysis is needed. The following 
chapter brings more insight into these results, since with regression models it is possible to test 
whether there are statistically significant causality among the independent and dependent variable 
or not.  
 
6.4 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
The multiple linear regression analysis is the main estimation method in this study. Multiple linear 
regressions reveal relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable, 
where its main purpose is to unveil how powerfully the independent variables explain the total 
variance  of  the  dependent  variable.  Correlation  analysis  gave  preliminary  predictions  on  possible  
associations between the variables. Those predictions are now further tested with multiple 
regression models in order to find causal relationships the correlation analysis did not provide.  
 
Earlier the mutual correlations were measured for independent variables in avoidance of 
multicollinearity problems in the regression analysis phase. In order to be sure that such problems 
are avoided, an additional test is carried through together with regression calculations. The measure, 
of which will be calculated is a variance inflation factor. Variance inflation factor or VIF analyzes 
the magnitude of multicollinearity. Neter, Wasserman et al. (1990, 409) suggest that a VIF value 
exceeding 10 should be taken as an indication that multicollinearity may be unduly influencing the 
regression estimates.  
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Multiple linear regression models have three purposes in this research. Firstly, to find out whether 
the company’s status, performance, size, capital adequacy, industry, and/or acquisition time has had 
impact on the transaction price, of which the acquirer have historically paid. Secondly, has the 
differences between private and public companies had had affects to the transaction price. Thirdly, 
to study those private companies, which have been sold at a discount and to find out whether 
performance, size, capital adequacy, industry, and/or acquisition price has had anything to do with 
it?  
 
The first multiple linear regression equation is as follows: 
(14) 
 
    
 
Table  11  presents  the  regression  results  for  transaction  price  variable.  Table  values  show  the  
estimated coefficients along with standard error and accompanying P-values. Additionally, the 
variance inflation factors are presented on the right side column. Standard error describes the 
standard deviation of the regression coefficients. P-values with significance level of 5% and greater 
are bolded.  Model  F-values  describe  the  fit  of  a  regression  model  and  adjusted  R2 values reflect 
how many percent of the total variation in the dependent variable can be explained with chosen 
independent variables (Neter, Wasserman et al. 1990, 519, 241).  
 
The findings in Table 11 suggest that the first model is statistically significant with P-value of 0.000 
and F-value of 4.22. The adjusted R2 for the model is 0.243. This model was build in order to find 
associations between transaction price and company specific factors. In this model, positive 
regression coefficient increases the transaction price, i.e. one unit increase in net assets increases the 
transaction price by approximately 11.788 units.  
 
Regression results demonstrate that net assets, sales and EBITDA associate positively with 
transaction price. In addition, the following industries can be stated to have negative associations 
with transaction price: Wholesale & Retail Trade (IND_4), Computer Integrated Systems Design 
(IND_7), and Engineering & Management Services (IND_11). Interesting and unforeseeable was 
that no evidence could be found that company’s status or acquisition year would have associations 
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to transaction price. Therefore, the association between private acquisition and transaction price, 
(hypotheses H2) could be overruled. This finding signifies statistically that private company 
discounts  does  not  exist  and  this  leads  to  overruling  the  previous  assumption  that  H1  holds.  
Interesting was also that acquisition years 2000 (YO_6) and 2001 (YO_5) did not have positive 
association to transaction price, when generally markets suffered heavy overpricing during the Dot-
Com bubble.  
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Table 11 Regression results for Transaction price 
This table reports the results for the entire sample of 242 companies. The dependent variable here is the PNA, which 
indicates the transaction price paid by acquirer. PNA is the transaction price divided by net assets of the particular 
company. The independent variables could be group into company status, size, performance, riskiness, industry and 
acquisition time. 1/NA is a reciprocal of net assets and SNA is sales divided by net assets. These both represent the size 
variable. EBITDANA is EBITDA divided by net assets and it is the performance variable. NDNA is net debt divided by 
net assets and it is the risk variable. Private is an indicator variable for the company status. IND_1-11 are indicator 
variables for the industry. YO_1-10 are indicator variables for the acquisition year. P-values with significance level of 
5% and greater are bolded. In addition, the highest VIF value is bolded as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 14.126 5.770 0.015 0.000
PRIVATE -1.504 2.199 0.495 1.086
1/NA 11.788 4.185 0.005 1.385
SNA 0.864 0.138 0.000 1.246
EBITDANA 2.017 0.630 0.002 1.240
NDNA 0.193 0.227 0.394 1.178
IND_2 -6.109 4.241 0.151 3.079
IND_3 -13.004 6.626 0.051 1.563
IND_4 -16.355 7.997 0.042 1.389
IND_5 -7.293 6.594 0.270 1.548
IND_6 -4.525 4.165 0.279 3.449
IND_7 -14.198 5.444 0.010 2.019
IND_8 0.459 6.260 0.942 1.659
IND_9 -15.080 7.980 0.060 1.384
IND_10 -9.522 7.319 0.195 1.538
IND_11 -22.609 9.511 0.018 1.321
YO_2 -1.794 5.447 0.742 2.293
YO_3 -5.727 5.537 0.302 2.552
YO_4 -7.442 5.185 0.153 2.917
YO_5 -5.178 5.334 0.333 2.616
YO_6 7.336 4.965 0.141 2.805
YO_7 1.239 5.865 0.833 2.236
YO_8 -1.128 5.839 0.847 2.635
YO_9 -6.683 5.877 0.257 2.459
YO_10 -6.902 6.194 0.266 2.004
Model F-value 4.22
Model P-value 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.243
Nobs 242
Independent variables Coefficient Standard error P-value VIF
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The second multiple linear regression can be expressed by the following equation:  (15) 
        
 
 
 
Table 12 presents the regression results for price differences between private and public companies. 
Second model was build in order to reveal causal relations between differences in transaction prices 
of private and public companies, and differences between independent variables of private and 
public companies.  
 
The second regression is again statistically significant with P-value of 0.002 and F-value of 2.33. 
The adjusted R2 is approximately 4.0 percent lower than in the first regression model, being exactly 
0.203. In this model, positive regression coefficients mean that the particular independent variable 
increases the transaction price gap between private companies and public companies. Negative 
associations have inverse affects to the transaction price difference.  
 
The results suggest that differences between private company’s sales and public company’s sales 
have positive and significant association to the transaction price difference between the private and 
public companies. Similar positive association can be found in the differences between EBITDA of 
a private company and a public company. Finally, the following two industries have significant 
positive relationship with transaction price gap: Manufacturing (IND_2) and Computer Integrated 
Systems Design (IND_7). Again it was interesting to see that acquisition time did not have any 
significant association with transaction price difference. One could have expected that during the 
economic boom there would not exist huge, or any price differences whether the company is private 
or public. Therefore, the expectations could have been that acquisition years 2000 (YO_6) and 2001 
(YO_7) would have yielded negative causal relationships with transaction price gap.   
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Table 12 Regression result for the price difference between private and public targets 
This table reports the results for the 121 acquisition pairs. The dependent variable here is the PPrivate/NAPrivate-
PPublic/NAPublic, which indicates the difference between the transaction price of a private and public company. The 
independent variables could be group into company status, size difference, performance difference, difference in 
riskiness, industry and acquisition time. 1/NAPrivatte – 1/NAPubliv is a reciprocal of net assets of private company minus 
corresponding figure for public company and SNAPrivate-SNAPublic is private company’s sales divided by its net assets 
minus public company’s sales divided by its net assets. EBITDANAPrivate-EBITDANAPublic is private company’s EBITDA 
divided by its net assets minus public company’s EBITDA divided by its net assets. NDNAPrivate-NDNAPublic is private 
company’s net debt divided by its net assets minus public company’s net debt divided by its net assets. IND_1-11 are 
indicator variables for the industry. YO_1-10 are indicator variables for the acquisition year. P-values with significance 
level of 5% and greater are bolded. In addition, the highest VIF value is bolded as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -9.704 10.614 0.363 0.000
1/NAPrivate - 1/NAPublic 0.843 10.336 0.935 1.242
SNAPrivate - SNAPublic 0.979 0.184 0.000 1.098
EBITDANAPrivate - EBITDANAPublic 1.876 0.926 0.046 1.195
NDNAPrivate - NDNAPublic -0.666 0.349 0.060 1.315
IND_2 17.144 8.338 0.042 3.200
IND_3 11.853 13.487 0.382 1.741
IND_4 18.705 15.451 0.229 1.394
IND_5 12.006 12.945 0.356 1.603
IND_6 11.976 8.102 0.143 3.509
IND_7 25.026 10.590 0.020 2.054
IND_8 8.318 12.564 0.510 1.797
IND_9 20.233 15.211 0.187 1.351
IND_10 19.349 14.522 0.186 1.628
IND_11 3.665 18.234 0.841 1.305
YO_2 0.450 10.060 0.964 2.344
YO_3 2.263 10.960 0.837 1.998
YO_4 -0.903 9.625 0.925 2.702
YO_5 -0.977 9.566 0.919 2.536
YO_6 1.526 9.371 0.871 2.562
YO_7 -15.051 11.208 0.183 2.089
YO_8 -19.405 10.728 0.074 2.483
YO_9 -10.142 10.791 0.350 2.513
YO_10 2.266 12.476 0.856 1.772
Model F-value 2.33
Model P-value 0.002
Adjusted R2 0.203
Nobs 121
Independent variables Coefficient Standard error P-value VIF
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Third and final multiple linear regression equation is as follows:    (16) 
 
 
Table 13 presents the regression results for private companies, of which were sold at a lower price 
compared to a public peer company. This final model was build in order to reveal relationships 
between the private companies, of which were sold at a lower price compared to a public peer 
company, and the independent variables used along the regression phase. The companies to which 
the regression analysis is implemented are chosen from the equation where private company 
transaction price (divided by its net assets) is deducted with public company transaction price 
(divided by its net assets). Those acquisition pairs that yield a negative answer are chosen, leading 
to a total of 49 pairs. 
 
The third regression is again statistically significant with P-value of 0.0141 and F-value of 2.48. 
Furthermore, the adjusted R2 is approximately 16.1 percent higher than in the first regression model 
and approximately 20.1 percent higher than in the second model, being exactly 0.404. This indicates 
that the independent variables in this model have the highest abilities to predict the variation of the 
dependent variable, compared to the previous ones. In this model positive regression coefficients 
mean that the particular independent variable decreases the transaction price gap between the 
private and public companies. Negative regression coefficient naturally increases the transaction 
price gap.  
 
The results suggest that net assets and the difference between net debt of private and public 
company have a positive and statistically significant relationship between the transaction price gaps. 
The net debt variable shows that when the net debt gap decreases by one unit, the transaction price 
gap decreases as well. This is in line with the result found by Kooli, Kortas et al.  (2003). 
Interesting, however, is when net debt increases by one unit the transaction gap decreases by 
approximately 0.446 units. In addition, the acquisition year 2000 (YO_6) have positive and 
statistically significant association with transaction price gap. Meaning that the gap in that particular 
year was smaller than it was compared to years 2008 and 2007 (YO_1). The latter relationship was 
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as expected. Interestingly, it seems that the industry where companies are operating does not have 
any significant affects on the discount applied to private companies. 
Table 13 Regression results for private company discount 
This table reports the results for the 49 private acquisition of where private company’s transaction price-to-net assets are 
smaller than the peer public company’s. The dependent variable here is the (PPrivate/NAPrivate-PPublic/NAPublic,)<0, of which 
the companies are selected based on the negative outcome criteria. The independent variables could be group into size, 
performance, riskiness, industry and acquisition time categories. 1/NA is a reciprocal of net assets of private company 
and SNA is private company’s sales divided by its net assets. These both represent the size variable. EBITDANA is 
private company’s EBITDA divided by its net assets and it is the performance variable. NDNA is private company’s net 
debt divided by its net assets and it is the risk variable. IND_1-10 are indicator variables for the industry. YO_1-10 are 
indicator variables for the acquisition year. P-values with significance level of 5% and greater are bolded. In addition, 
the highest VIF value is bolded as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -0.766 5.788 0.896 0.000
1/NA 11.182 5.011 0.035 2.280
SNAPrivate - SNAPublic 0.608 0.458 0.196 2.546
EBITDANAPrivate-EBITDANAPublic -2.378 2.585 0.366 3.618
NDNAPrivate-NDNAPublic 0.446 0.166 0.012 2.641
IND_2 0.732 5.017 0.885 4.554
IND_3 2.242 5.695 0.697 2.527
IND_4 -11.491 9.410 0.233 1.840
IND_5 -1.437 8.749 0.871 1.591
IND_6 2.736 4.655 0.562 4.785
IND_7 0.142 5.732 0.980 3.669
IND_8 -9.985 7.036 0.168 2.957
IND_9 -1.977 6.724 0.771 1.840
IND_10 * -17.587 9.587 0.078 1.910
YO_2 1.001 5.483 0.857 2.342
YO_3 -8.042 6.469 0.225 2.500
YO_4 -3.350 5.348 0.537 3.640
YO_5 2.312 5.118 0.655 3.333
YO_6 11.038 5.299 0.047 3.574
YO_7 4.485 5.500 0.422 2.881
YO_8 -1.918 6.071 0.755 4.117
YO_9 1.160 6.205 0.853 3.000
YO_10 0.266 6.917 0.970 1.947
Model F-value 2.48
Model P-value 0.0141
Adjusted R2 0.404
Nobs 49
* Industry Engineering & Management services (IND_11) is excluded since it had zero observations
Independent variables Coefficient Standard error P-value VIF
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6.5 INTERPRETATION OF THE RESUTS 
 
The findings, using relatively same methods as Kooli, Kortas et al. (2003), Block (2007) and 
Koeplin, Sarin et al. (2000), suggest that on average private companies are sold at a discount 
compared to publicly traded peer companies. The private company discount was measured by 
calculating four different multiples for the 242 companies in the sample. Kooli, Kortas et al. (2003) 
found that on average the private companies suffer a quite substantial discount of 34 percent. Block 
presents results where private company discounts vary from 16.25 percent to 27.1 percent whereas 
Koeplin, Sarin et al. (2000) suggest that private company discounts are somewhere between -2.28 
(premium) percent and 28.26 percent. The results obtained in this research are fairly consistent with 
the results yielded from the previous studies (for detailed description, see Appendix 6). The results 
from valuation multiples demonstrate that the discount do exists on average, yet two median 
multiples presented quite hefty premiums.  
 
After the valuation multiples expressed valuation differences between private and public companies 
and correlation coefficients showed that there exist correlations between the transaction price and 
the independent variables, it was logical to build regression models, to analyze the data, and in 
order to find causal relationships. The results from the first regression model demonstrate clearly 
that the following independent variables have significant relationship with the transaction price the 
acquirers have been willing to pay: net assets, sales, and EBITDA. Also companies in the wholesale 
& retail trade industry, computer-integrated systems design industry, and engineering & 
management services industry have significant negative associations with transaction price. 
Interestingly, no evidence could be found to prove that company status would have affects on the 
transaction price and therefore private company discounts do not exist. This was measured by 
private company indicator variable, which had a P-value of 0.4947, and is not statistically 
significant. Neither any statistically significant evidence could be found to prove that acquisition 
time would have causal relations with transaction price. Conclusion is that company status does not 
have any influence on transaction prices contrary to the hypotheses H1 and H2. One reasonable 
answer for this could be found from information asymmetries that exist. Selling party has an 
advantage, compared to possible acquirers, in the name of sufficient and appropriate information. If 
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this is the case, then the company’s fundamental factors may have little weight compared to 
acquirer’s subjective predictions. 
 
Further analysis of the transaction price differences between private and public companies reveals 
that company’s size indeed can explain variation in it. As a size indicator, sales have an increasing 
effect on the transaction price gap. This is as hypothesized in the hypothesis H3A. In addition to 
previous, company’s performance has also increasing effect on the transaction price gap as 
hypothesized in the hypothesis H3B. Hypothesis H3C can be ruled out since there is no significant 
association between the net debt and transaction price gap. Hypothesis H3D holds since the 
industries Manufacturing and Computer Integrated Systems Design have significant negative 
relationship with transaction price gap. However, the acquisition time again shows no statistical 
significance, and therefore the hypothesis H3E can be ruled out. 
 
Finally, the third and last regression model concentrated on finding factors to explain the 
transaction price gaps between private and public companies. The results suggest that net assets 
together with the net debt gap between private and public companies have positive and significant 
relationship with transaction price gap, meaning that these two independent variables have 
decreasing effects on the transaction price discount of private companies. This is in line with the 
results found by Kooli, Kortas et al. (2003) and Koeplin, Sarin et al. (2000). Based on the results of 
this study, the hypothesis H4A and hypothesis H4C holds. Furthermore, it seems that the acquisition 
year 2000 have been beneficial for sellers of private companies, since on that year the transaction 
price gap has been significantly smaller than compared to the year 2008. This leads to a conclusion 
that hypothesis H4E holds. However, neither the performance, nor the industry the company 
operates has any association to the price gap. This is quite interesting, since at least past 
performance  should  play  an  important  role  in  the  valuation  phase.  Besides,  Kooli,  Kortas  et  al.  
(2003) and Block (2007) found significant evidence that the industry where company operates 
indeed can have impacts to the size of the price gap. Nevertheless, based on this study the 
hypotheses H4B and H4D can be ruled out.  
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7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 SUMMARY 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether private companies are sold at a discount compared 
to public peer companies and if so, could this be explained by variables related to company’s size, 
performance, riskiness, industry, and/or acquisition time. The sample consists of U.S.-based 
privately held and publicly traded companies, acquired between the years 1989 and 2008.  
 
A number of previous studies have examined the private company discount for lack of 
marketability. The previous literature offers at least four different approaches to study this 
phenomenon; the acquisition approach, IPO approach, restricted stock approach, and exit multiple 
approach. These studies provide evidence that privately held companies suffer from illiquidity 
discounts compared to publicly traded peer companies (see e.g. Block 2007, Officer 2007, Kooli, 
Kortas et al. 2003, Emory 2002, 2000, 1997, 1994, Sarin, Das et al. 2002, Bajaj, Denis et al. 2001, 
Koeplin, Sarin et al. 2001, Hertzel and Smith 1993, Silber 1991, Wruck 1989). This thesis 
concentrates on studying the private company discount from acquisition point of view. Koeplin, 
Sarin et al. (2001), Block (2007), and Kooli, Kortas et al. (2003) studies private company discounts 
using relatively same method as chosen for this thesis; however the perspectives of these studies are 
narrower than applied here. This thesis is an extension of these studies as it analyses acquisitions by 
taking more extensive amount of explanatory variables into account and by applying various 
regression models to find causal relationships affecting the acquisition prices. Furthermore, only 
Kooli, Kortas et al. (2003) studies private company discounts by taking acquisition time into 
analyses. In addition, the sample period of this research is more recent and wider, compared to 
Kooli, Kortas et al. (2003), which consists the years from 1995 to 2002.  
 
The research design involves examining all the unconditional, completed, and disclosed U.S.-based 
acquisitions between the years 1989 and 2008. The aim is to build a sample consisting comparable 
pairs of private and public acquisitions. The initial sample consists 23,872 companies. This sample 
is then sorted in order to identify similar private and public acquisitions to build acquisition pairs. 
These pairs have to meet the following three criteria’s: targets operate in the same industry, targets 
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are close in size, and they are acquired around the same time. To be more exact, all the acquisitions 
have to be acquired for 100 percent of shares outstanding, the primary four-digit Standard Industrial 
Code (SIC) have to be exactly the same for both companies, the date when the transaction of private 
company took place has to be within 12 months (plus or minus) with the public company in 
question, and finally the size of net assets of private company has to be within 20 percent (plus or 
minus) with the public company in question. After sorting the initial sample, the grand total of 
companies matching with these criteria’s is 242, i.e. 121 pairs.  
 
After the sample is gathered, the multiples valuation method is applied in order to define whether 
the private companies have indeed sold at a discount or not. The multiples valuation includes four 
multiples,  Price-to-Net  Assets,  Price-to-Sales,  Price-to-EBIT,  and  Price-to-EBITDA.  These  
multiples are calculated for each of the companies and later on the mean and median values are 
gathered for both group of targets. After this, the discount (premium) is calculated simply by 
dividing the private targets mean and median multiples with public ones (i.e. Private companies 
Price-to-Net  Assets  (mean)  /  Public  companies  Price-to-Net  Assets  (mean)  –  1).  The  essence  of  
further analysis on the valuation differences is to find causal relationships of different variables 
causing this. This involves estimating a series of multiples regression models.  
 
The results from valuation multiples analysis demonstrate that privately held companies in the U.S. 
are on average sold at a lower price, compared to their comparable publicly traded companies. Out 
of the four valuation multiples used in this thesis, the outcome was that every one of them yielded a 
discount. However, there is a variance among the multiples, since two median multiples yielded 
quite strong premiums. These results are somewhat as expected and fairly consistent with the three 
previous studies presented earlier.  
 
Further analysis of the existing valuation differences reveals that the acquisition prices in general 
can be partly explained by factors related to company size, performance and the industry it operates. 
The findings from regression analyses, however, did not yield any evidence backing the assumption 
that company status would be causally related with acquisition price, meaning private company 
discounts does not exist when studied by regression analysis. The explaining factors increasing the 
price  gap  between  the  two  groups  are  Sales,  EBITDA  and  the  following  two  industries:  
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Manufacturing  and  Computer  Integrated  Systems  Design.  Finally,  the  most  interesting  part  was  
when the factors explaining the private company discount (based on the valuation multiples) were 
revealed. The variables decreasing the transaction price gaps between the private and public 
companies are Net Assets and Net Debt and the variable increasing it was the acquisition year 2000.  
 
These results are of interest to private company owners when considering the sales of a company, as 
well as investors, in deciding of whether to invest into a privately held company and to assessing 
the valuation of such company compared to public one. 
 
7.2 SHORTCOMINGS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
In this thesis the study sample sets its limitations on the generalization of the results. The sample 
size is somewhat small and exceptional due to the economic boom in 2000 (Dot-Com) and 
downturn in 2007 (Subprime-crisis). In addition, the variance of the variables is considerably 
significant, meaning the mean and median variables are quite dispersed which lowers the credibility 
of the results presented in this thesis. 
 
In this thesis, the potential validity threats relate to the validity of the variables, meaning the quality 
of the empirical measures. One potential validity threat is the market variables, since these variables 
are per the reporting year-end or the last twelve months prior to acquisition. Therefore, the general 
market development during the study period cannot be controlled. Additionally, the variance and 
characteristics between the acquisitions in chosen pairs can be substantially significant, since the 
time of acquisition can be up to one year apart from the other, and the net assets to differ up to 10 
percent. Furthermore, the intention was to select three or five year average accounting and market 
values, but this proved out to be impossible due to the large raw-sample of acquisitions and the data 
limitations.  
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7.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This thesis concentrated on studying U.S.-based mergers and acquisitions using the acquisition 
approach. Future research could potentially widen the region to consist companies from other 
countries. It would be interesting to investigate how the transaction prices differ among private and 
public targets, for example in Europe, Asia, South America, and/or the Baltic region. The region 
effect could be controlled by pooling the acquisitions and adding an indicator variable for each of 
the regions. However, in many countries, like Finland, the data concerning private company 
acquisitions is not public. Therefore, first should be ensured that the data needed for study could be 
collected with reasonable effort.  
 
Future research could also include possible ex-post angle in viewing the private company discount. 
It would be interesting to study whether the results obtained by valuation multiples approach still 
hold, for example after one year from acquisition. Basically, is the discount long lasting or just a 
passing phenomena at the time of acquisition.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76
8 REFERENCES 
 
BVR'S guide to discounts for lack of marketability : 2008 edition : now includes the DLOM case 
law contents. 2008. Portland, OR: Business Valuation Resources, 2008.  
ABRAMS, J.B., 2000. Quantitative Business Valuation : A Mathematical Approach for Today's 
Professionals. Blacklick, OH, USA: McGraw-Hill Companies, The.  
ABRAMS, J.B., 1994. Discount for Lack of Marketability: A Theoretical Model. Business 
Valuation Review, 13(3),.  
AKERLOF, G.A., 1970. The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500.  
ANDRADE, G., MITCHELL, M. and STAFFORD, E., 2001. New Evidence and Perspectives on 
Mergers. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 103-120.  
ANG, J.S. and CHENG, Y., 2006. Direct Evidence on the Market-Driven Acquisition Theory. 
Journal of Financial Research, 29(2), 199-216.  
ANTONIOU, A., ARBOUR, P. and ZHAO, H., 2008. How Much Is Too Much: Are Merger 
Premiums Too High? European Financial Management, 14(2), 268-287.  
BAJAJ, M., DENIS, D.J., FERRIS, S.P. and SARIN, A., 2001. Firm value and marketability 
discounts. Journal of Corporation Law, 27(1), 89.  
BERGSTRESSER, D. and PHILIPPON, T., 2006. CEO incentives and earnings management. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 80(3), 511.  
BERKOVITCH, E. and NARAYANAN, M.P., 1993. Motives for takeovers: An empirical 
investigation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28(3), 347.  
BLOCK, S., 2007. The Liquidity Discount in Valuing Privately Owned Companies. Journal of 
Applied Finance, 17(2), 33-40.  
BRADLEY, M., DESAI, A. and KIM, E.H., 1988. Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions 
and Their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 21(1), 3.  
BREALEY, R.A., MYERS, S.C. and ALLEN, F., 2008. Principles of corporate finance. Boston, 
MA: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2008.  
BURKE JR., F.M., 1981. Valuation and Valuation Planning for Closely Held Businesses. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77
CHAFFE III, D.B.H., 1993. Option Pricing as a Proxy for Discount for Lack of Marketability in 
Private Company Valuations. Business Valuation Review, (December),.  
DEAN, B.V. and GIGLIERANO, J.J., 1990. Multistage Financing of Technical Start-Up 
Companies in Silicon Valley. Journal of Business Venturing, 5(6), 375.  
DIERKENS, N., 1991. Information Asymmetry and Equity Issues. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 26(2), 181-199.  
DONG, M., HIRSHLEIFER, D., RICHARDSON, S. and TEOH, S.H., 2006. Does Investor 
Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market? Journal of Finance, 61(2), 725-762.  
EMORY SR., J.D., DENGEL III, F.R. and EMORY JR., J.D., 2002. Discounts for Lack of 
Marketability, Emory Pre-IPO Studies 1980-2000 As Adjusted October 10, 2002. Business 
Valuation Review, (December),.  
EMORY, J.D., 1997. The Value of Marketability as Illustrated in Initial Public Offerings of 
Common Stock, November 1995 through April 1997. Business Valuation Review, 16(3),.  
FELTHAM, G.A. and OHLSON, J.A., 1995. Valuation and clean surplus accounting for operating 
and financial activities. Contemporary Accounting Research, 11(2), 689.  
FRANCIS, J., OLSSON, P. and OSWALD, D.R., 2000. Comparing the accuracy and explainability 
of dividend, free cash flow, and abnormal earnings equity value estimates. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 38(1), 45.  
FRIEDMAN, J.P., 2000. Dictionary of business terms. Hauppauge, NY: Barron's, 2000.  
GHAURI, P.N. and GRØNHAUG, K., 2005. Research methods in business studies : a practical 
guide. Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall, 2005.  
GORDON, M.J. and ELI, S.H.A.P.I.R.O., 1956. Capital Equipment Analysis: the Required Rate of 
Profit. Management Science (pre-1986), 3(1), 102.  
GORT, M., 1969. An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
83(4), 624-642.  
GRINBLATT, M. and KELOHARJU, M., 2009. Sensation Seeking, Overconfidence, and Trading 
Activity. The Journal of Finance, 64(2), 549.  
HARFORD, J., 2005. What drives merger waves? Journal of Financial Economics, 77(3), 529-560.  
HEALY, P.M., PALEPU, K.G. and RUBACK, R.S., 1992. Does Corporate Performance Improve 
After Mergers? Journal of Financial Economics, 31(2), 135.  
HERTZEL, M. and SMITH, R.L., 1993. Market discounts and shareholder gains for placing equity 
privately. The Journal of Finance, 48(2), 459.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 78
JARRELL, G.A., BRICKLEY, J.A. and SCHERER, J.M.N.M., 1988. The Market for Corporate 
Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980 Corporate Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments. The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives (1986-1998), 2(1), 49.  
JENSEN, M.C., 1993. The modern idustrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control 
systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831.  
JENSEN, M.C., 1986. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. 
American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329.  
JENSEN, M.C. and MECKLING, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.  
JENSEN, M.C. and RUBACK, R.S., 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific 
Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4), 5.  
JOVANOVIC, B. and ROUSSEAU, P.L., 2002. The Q-theory of mergers. The American Economic 
Review, 92(2), 198.  
KAPLAN, S.N. and RUBACK, R.S., 1995. The valuation of cash flow forecasts: An empirical 
analysis. The Journal of Finance, 50(4), 1059.  
KOEPLIN, J., SARIN, A. and SHAPIRO, A.C., 2000. The private company discount. The Bank of 
America Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 12(4), 94.  
KOOLI, M., KORTAS, M. and L'HER, J., 2003. A New Examination of the Private Company 
Discount: The Acquisition Approach. Journal of Private Equity, 6(3), 48.  
LAMBERT, R.A., 2001. Contracting theory and accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
32(1-3), 3-87.  
LIND, D.A., MARCHAL, W.G. and WATHEN, S.A., 2010. Statistical techniques in business & 
economics. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2010.  
LJUNGQVIST, A. and WILHELM, W.J., JR., 2003. IPO Pricing in the Dot-Com Bubble. Journal 
of Finance, 58(2), 723-752.  
LO, K. and LYS, T., 2000. The Ohlson model: Contribution to valuation theory, limitations, and 
empirical applications. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 15(3), 337.  
MARREN, J.H., 1993. Mergers & Acquisitions: A Valuation Handbook. First edn. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.  
MERCER, Z.C., 1997. Quantifying Marketability Discounts. Peabody Publishing.  
MITCHELL, M.L. and MULHERIN, J.H., 1996. The impact of industry shocks on takeover and 
restructuring activity. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(2), 193.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 79
MORCK, R., SHLEIFER, A. and VISHNY, R.W., 1990. Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad 
Acquisitions? The Journal of Finance, 45(1), 31.  
MYERS, S.C. and MAJLUF, N.S., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms 
have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 187-221.  
NATH, E.W., 1997. How Public Guideline Companies Represent "Control" Value for a Private 
Company. Business Valuation Review, 16(4),.  
NETER, J., WASSERMAN, W. and KUTNER, M.H., 1990. Applied linear statistical models : 
regression, analysis of variance and experimental designs. Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1990.  
ODED, J. and MICHEL, A., 2007. Reconciling DCF Valuation Methodologies. Journal of Applied 
Finance, 17(2), 21.  
OFFICER, M.S., 2007. The Price of Corporate Liquidity: Acquisition Discounts for Unlisted 
Targets. Journal of Financial Economics, 83(3), 571-598.  
OHLSON, J.A., 1995. Earnings, book values, and dividends in equity valuation. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 11(2), 661.  
PALEPU, K.G., HEALY, P.M. and BERNARD, V.L., 2004. Business analysis & valuation : using 
financial statements : text & cases. Mason, Ohio: Thomson/South-Western, cop. 2004.  
PRATT, S.P., 2005. The market approach to valuing businesses  
. Second edn. John Wiley & Sons.  
PRATT, S.P., 2001. Business valuation discounts and premiums. New York: Wiley, 2001.  
PRATT, S.P., REILLY, R.F. and SCHWEIHS, R.P., 2000. Valuing a Business : The Analysis and 
Appraisal of Closely Held Companies (4th Edition). Blacklick, OH, USA: McGraw-Hill 
Companies, The.  
RHODES-KROPF, M. and VISWANATHAN, S., 2004. Market Valuation and Merger Waves. 
Journal of Finance, 59(6), 2685-2718.  
RHODES–KROPF, M., ROBINSON, D.T. and VISWANATHAN, S., 2005. Valuation waves and 
merger activity: The empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(3), 561-603.  
ROLL, R., 1986. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. The Journal of Business, 59(2), 
197.  
SARIN, A., DAS, S.R. and JAGANNATHAN, M., 2002. The Private Equity Discount: An 
Empirical Examination of the Exit of Venture Backed Companies. Working paper edn. Santa Clara 
University: .  
SARIN, A., 2001. Firm Value and Marketability Discounts. Journal of Corporation Law, 27(1), 89.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80
SCHROEDER, R.G., CLARK, M.W. and CATHEY, J.M., 2009. Financial accounting theory and 
analysis : text and cases. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009.  
SHLEIFER, A. and VISHNY, R.W., 2003. Stock market driven acquistions. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 70(3), 295.  
SILBER, W.L., 1991. Discounts on Restricted Stock: The Impact of Illiquidity on Stock Prices. 
Financial Analysts Journal, 47(4), 60.  
SMITH, A. and CANNAN, E., 1976. An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1976.  
STIGLER, G.J., 1961. The Economics of Information. The Journal of Political Economy, 69(3), 
213-225.  
STOWE, J.D., 2002. Analysis of equity investments : valuation. Charlottesville, VA: Association 
for Investment Management and Research, 2002.  
WILLIAMS, J.B., 1940. The Theory of Investment Value, Harvard University.  
WRUCK, K.H., 1989. Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private 
Equity Financings. Journal of Financial Economics, 23(1), 3.  
ZUCKERMAN, M., 1979. Sensation Seeking: Beyond the Optimal Level of Arousal. 1st edition 
edn. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 81
9 APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1 
VALUATION MULTIPLES DEFINITION 
 
 
Variable Description
Value of Transaction Total value of consideration paid by the acquiror, excluding fees and expenses. The dollar value
includes the amount paid for all common stock, common stock equivalents, preferred stock,
debt, options, assets, warrants, and stake purchases made within six months of the 
announcement date of the transaction.
Sales Multiple Ratio of Transaction Value to Sales. Sales are the primary source of revenue after deductions of
returned goods and price reductions for the last 12 months ending on the date of most current 
financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction.
Asset M ultiple Ratio of Transaction Value to net assets. Net assets is defined as a differnce between total 
assets and total liabilities.
EBIT M ultiple Ratio of Transaction Value to EBIT. EBIT is defined as earnings before interest income, interest
expense and taxes for the 12 months ending on the date of the most current financial information
prior to the announcement of the transction
EBITDA M ultiple Ratio of Transaction Value to EBITDA. EBITDA is defined as earnings before interest income,
interest expense, taxes, depreciation, and amortization for the 12 months ending on the date of 
the most current financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction
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APPENDIX 2A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2B 
INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATIONS
VARIABLE SIC-CODES INDUSTRY TITLE HITS
IND_1 1000-1499 Mining 24
IND_2 2000-3999 Manufacturing 62
IND_3 4000-4999 Transportation 10
IND_4 5000-5999 Wholesale & Retail Trade 6
IND_5 7322-7371 Business Services 10
IND_6 7372-7372 Prepackaged Software 80
IND_7 7373-7373 Computer Integrated Systems Design 20
IND_8 7375-7375 Computer Retrieval Services 12
IND_9 7379-7389 Computer Related Services & Business Services * 6
IND_10 8000-8099 Health Services 8
IND_11 8700-8799 Engineering & Management Services 4
* Not Elsewhere Classified
ACQUISITION YEAR CLASSIFICATION
VARIABLE ACQUISITION YEARS HITS
YO_1 2008, 2007 18
YO_2 2006 23
YO_3 2005, 2004 25
YO_4 2003, 2002 34
YO_5 2001 28
YO_6 2000 36
YO_7 1999 19
YO_8 1998, 1997 23
YO_9 1996, 1995, 1994, 1993 21
YO_10 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989 15
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APPENDIX 3 
INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
SIC CODES
TWO DIGIT SUB-HEADINGS
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 01-09 0
Mining 10-14 24
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 24
Construction 15-17 0
Manufacturing 20-39 62
Food and Kindered Products 2
Wood Products, Furniture and Fixtures 2
Drugs 12
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 2
Machinery 2
Computer and Office Equipment 2
Communications Equipment 8
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 10
Transportation Equipment 2
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment;Clocks 20
Transportation & Public Utilities 40-49 10
Air Transportation and Shipping Telecommunications 2
Telecommunications 8
Wholesale Trade 50-51 2
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 2
Retail Trade 52-59 4
Retail Trade-Eating and Drinking Places 2
Retail Trade-Miscellaneous Retail Trade 2
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 60-67 -
Services 70-89 140
Consumer & Mercantile Credit Reporting Agencies 2
Direct Mail Advertising Services 2
Equipment Rental & Leasing (Not Elsewhere Classified) 2
Computer Programming Services 4
Prepackaged Software 80
Computer Integrated Systems Design 20
Information Retrieval Services 12
Computer Related Services (Not Elsewhere Classified) 2
Business Services (Not Elsewhere Classified) 4
Skilled Nursing Care Facilities 2
Medical Laboratories 2
Home Health Care Services 4
Engineering Services 2
Management Consulting Services 2
CATEGORIES HITS
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APPENDIX 4 
 
This table presents the correlation coefficients between the dependent variable and the independent variables for the 
private companies acquired. PNA is the transaction price divided by net assets of the particular company, 1/NA is  a  
reciprocal of net assets, SNA is sales divided by net assets, EBITDANA is EBITDA divided by net assets, and NDNA is 
net debt divided by net assets. IND_1-11 are indicator variables for the industry (see Appendix 2A). YO_1-10 are 
indicator variables for the acquisition year (see Appendix 2B). Pearson correlation coefficients are presented below the 
diagonal and the Spearman rank correlation coefficients are above the diagonal. Correlation coefficients with 
significance level of 5% (0.05) and greater are bolded. P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PNA RNA SALES EBITDA NDEBT IND_2 IND_3 IND_4 IND_5 IND_6 IND_7 IND_8 IND_9
IND_ 
10
IND_ 
11 YO_2 YO_3 YO_4 YO_5 YO_6 YO_7 YO_8 YO_9 YO_10
PNA 0.260 0.344 0.164 0.087 0.025 -0.100 -0.103 0.127 0.097 -0.035 0.065 0.143 -0.034 -0.028 0.070 0.068 -0.171 -0.102 0.277 -0.029 -0.055 -0.037 -0.070
(0.004) (0.000) (0.072) (0.341) (0.786) (0.276) (0.259) (0.164) (0.290) (0.701) (0.476) (0.118) (0.708) (0.762) (0.449) (0.458) (0.061) (0.266) (0.002) (0.753) (0.552) (0.685) (0.447)
RNA 0.105 0.284 -0.082 0.081 -0.196 -0.140 0.088 0.068 0.174 -0.038 0.095 0.100 0.081 0.127 -0.123 0.222 -0.144 -0.025 0.109 -0.153 0.196 0.069 -0.023
(0.252) (0.002) (0.373) (0.375) (0.032) (0.125) (0.340) (0.460) (0.057) (0.681) (0.298) (0.273) (0.375) (0.165) (0.180) (0.014) (0.115) (0.787) (0.234) (0.094) (0.032) (0.453) (0.799)
SALES 0.297 0.181 0.511 -0.011 0.115 -0.146 0.204 0.031 -0.126 0.159 -0.013 0.081 0.062 0.187 -0.006 0.133 -0.119 -0.273 -0.165 -0.009 0.240 0.203 0.078
(0.001) (0.047) (0.000) (0.908) (0.207) (0.110) (0.025) (0.737) (0.168) (0.082) (0.887) (0.379) (0.498) (0.040) (0.947) (0.147) (0.193) (0.002) (0.071) (0.922) (0.008) (0.026) (0.392)
EBITDA 0.088 -0.035 0.182 -0.241 0.142 -0.081 0.043 -0.017 -0.198 -0.001 -0.124 0.158 0.075 0.108 0.222 -0.035 -0.034 -0.102 -0.287 -0.060 0.055 0.207 0.090
(0.335) (0.706) (0.046) (0.008) (0.120) (0.378) (0.643) (0.856) (0.030) (0.993) (0.175) (0.083) (0.411) (0.240) (0.015) (0.702) (0.711) (0.266) (0.001) (0.510) (0.552) (0.023) (0.324)
NDEBT 0.288 -0.009 0.108 -0.239 0.014 -0.034 0.097 0.056 -0.063 0.010 0.149 -0.152 -0.036 -0.085 -0.241 0.059 0.144 -0.012 0.089 0.010 -0.039 -0.072 0.044
(0.001) (0.921) (0.239) (0.008) (0.883) (0.707) (0.288) (0.543) (0.490) (0.911) (0.102) (0.096) (0.697) (0.352) (0.008) (0.523) (0.114) (0.897) (0.331) (0.914) (0.673) (0.432) (0.635)
IND_2 0.064 -0.194 0.038 0.111 -0.025 -0.122 -0.094 -0.122 -0.412 -0.176 -0.134 -0.094 -0.109 -0.076 0.163 0.050 0.035 -0.117 -0.128 0.050 -0.005 0.059 -0.047
(0.483) (0.033) (0.682) (0.227) (0.788) (0.183) (0.307) (0.183) (0.000) (0.053) (0.143) (0.307) (0.236) (0.407) (0.074) (0.585) (0.702) (0.200) (0.161) (0.585) (0.959) (0.523) (0.610)
IND_3 -0.099 -0.058 -0.101 -0.008 -0.044 -0.122 -0.033 -0.043 -0.146 -0.062 -0.047 -0.033 -0.038 -0.027 0.062 -0.059 -0.084 0.164 -0.084 -0.059 -0.069 -0.069 -0.047
(0.278) (0.527) (0.273) (0.929) (0.629) (0.183) (0.719) (0.639) (0.110) (0.497) (0.606) (0.719) (0.676) (0.770) (0.499) (0.521) (0.360) (0.072) (0.360) (0.521) (0.453) (0.453) (0.606)
IND_4 -0.084 0.080 0.173 0.030 -0.015 -0.094 -0.033 -0.033 -0.112 -0.048 -0.036 -0.025 -0.029 -0.021 -0.055 -0.045 0.088 -0.062 -0.064 -0.045 0.303 -0.053 -0.036
(0.359) (0.385) (0.058) (0.743) (0.868) (0.307) (0.719) (0.719) (0.221) (0.602) (0.692) (0.782) (0.748) (0.822) (0.547) (0.623) (0.335) (0.498) (0.482) (0.623) (0.001) (0.564) (0.692)
IND_5 0.074 0.006 0.239 0.018 -0.026 -0.122 -0.043 -0.033 -0.146 -0.062 -0.047 -0.033 -0.038 -0.027 0.062 -0.059 -0.084 -0.081 0.036 0.099 0.070 0.070 -0.047
(0.421) (0.950) (0.008) (0.848) (0.773) (0.183) (0.639) (0.719) (0.110) (0.497) (0.606) (0.719) (0.676) (0.770) (0.499) (0.521) (0.360) (0.377) (0.699) (0.278) (0.445) (0.445) (0.606)
IND_6 0.085 0.187 -0.156 -0.118 -0.042 -0.412 -0.146 -0.112 -0.146 -0.211 -0.161 -0.112 -0.130 -0.091 -0.017 0.203 0.019 0.037 0.120 -0.132 -0.116 -0.057 -0.080
(0.354) (0.041) (0.088) (0.198) (0.647) (0.000) (0.110) (0.221) (0.110) (0.020) (0.079) (0.221) (0.156) (0.320) (0.854) (0.026) (0.834) (0.688) (0.189) (0.148) (0.207) (0.536) (0.386)
IND_7 -0.070 -0.083 0.164 0.026 -0.050 -0.176 -0.062 -0.048 -0.062 -0.211 -0.069 -0.048 -0.056 -0.039 -0.104 -0.085 -0.035 -0.117 -0.035 0.258 0.202 -0.100 0.070
(0.447) (0.364) (0.072) (0.776) (0.585) (0.053) (0.497) (0.602) (0.497) (0.020) (0.455) (0.602) (0.545) (0.672) (0.256) (0.354) (0.703) (0.201) (0.703) (0.004) (0.027) (0.277) (0.447)
IND_8 0.127 0.045 -0.009 -0.106 0.421 -0.134 -0.047 -0.036 -0.047 -0.161 -0.069 -0.036 -0.042 -0.030 -0.079 -0.065 0.017 0.023 0.236 -0.065 -0.076 -0.076 -0.052
(0.164) (0.624) (0.920) (0.246) (0.000) (0.143) (0.606) (0.692) (0.606) (0.079) (0.455) (0.692) (0.646) (0.747) (0.388) (0.480) (0.851) (0.800) (0.009) (0.480) (0.409) (0.409) (0.570)
IND_9 0.071 0.184 -0.004 0.082 -0.056 -0.094 -0.033 -0.025 -0.033 -0.112 -0.048 -0.036 -0.029 -0.021 0.116 -0.045 -0.064 -0.062 0.088 -0.045 -0.053 -0.053 0.208
(0.441) (0.044) (0.965) (0.370) (0.542) (0.307) (0.719) (0.782) (0.719) (0.221) (0.602) (0.692) (0.748) (0.822) (0.204) (0.623) (0.482) (0.498) (0.335) (0.623) (0.564) (0.564) (0.022)
IND_10 -0.062 0.034 -0.016 0.058 -0.035 -0.109 -0.038 -0.029 -0.038 -0.130 -0.056 -0.042 -0.029 -0.024 -0.064 -0.052 -0.075 -0.072 -0.075 0.124 -0.061 0.403 -0.042
(0.497) (0.709) (0.864) (0.526) (0.702) (0.236) (0.676) (0.748) (0.676) (0.156) (0.545) (0.646) (0.748) (0.794) (0.485) (0.568) (0.415) (0.431) (0.415) (0.176) (0.504) (0.000) (0.646)
IND_11 -0.042 0.073 0.159 0.081 -0.034 -0.076 -0.027 -0.021 -0.027 -0.091 -0.039 -0.030 -0.021 -0.024 -0.045 -0.037 -0.052 -0.051 0.134 -0.037 -0.043 -0.043 -0.030
(0.645) (0.426) (0.081) (0.378) (0.714) (0.407) (0.770) (0.822) (0.770) (0.320) (0.672) (0.747) (0.822) (0.794) (0.624) (0.689) (0.568) (0.582) (0.143) (0.689) (0.639) (0.639) (0.747)
YO_2 0.076 -0.097 -0.081 0.260 -0.094 0.163 0.062 -0.055 0.062 -0.017 -0.104 -0.079 0.116 -0.064 -0.045 -0.098 -0.140 -0.135 -0.140 -0.098 -0.115 -0.115 -0.079
(0.408) (0.289) (0.379) (0.004) (0.307) (0.074) (0.499) (0.547) (0.499) (0.854) (0.256) (0.388) (0.204) (0.485) (0.624) (0.283) (0.125) (0.139) (0.125) (0.283) (0.209) (0.209) (0.388)
YO_3 0.168 0.318 0.065 -0.007 0.037 0.050 -0.059 -0.045 -0.059 0.203 -0.085 -0.065 -0.045 -0.052 -0.037 -0.098 -0.115 -0.111 -0.115 -0.080 -0.094 -0.094 -0.065
(0.065) (0.000) (0.476) (0.940) (0.688) (0.585) (0.521) (0.623) (0.521) (0.026) (0.354) (0.480) (0.623) (0.568) (0.689) (0.283) (0.211) (0.227) (0.211) (0.381) (0.305) (0.305) (0.480)
YO_4 -0.184 -0.077 -0.063 -0.024 0.003 0.035 -0.084 0.088 -0.084 0.019 -0.035 0.017 -0.064 -0.075 -0.052 -0.140 -0.115 -0.158 -0.163 -0.115 -0.134 -0.134 -0.092
(0.043) (0.403) (0.491) (0.792) (0.972) (0.702) (0.360) (0.335) (0.360) (0.834) (0.703) (0.851) (0.482) (0.415) (0.568) (0.125) (0.211) (0.084) (0.073) (0.211) (0.142) (0.142) (0.314)
YO_5 -0.108 0.014 -0.179 -0.191 -0.039 -0.117 0.164 -0.062 -0.081 0.037 -0.117 0.023 -0.062 -0.072 -0.051 -0.135 -0.111 -0.158 -0.158 -0.111 -0.130 -0.130 -0.089
(0.237) (0.881) (0.050) (0.036) (0.674) (0.200) (0.072) (0.498) (0.377) (0.688) (0.201) (0.800) (0.498) (0.431) (0.582) (0.139) (0.227) (0.084) (0.084) (0.227) (0.157) (0.157) (0.331)
YO_6 0.298 0.060 -0.099 -0.152 0.212 -0.128 -0.084 -0.064 0.036 0.120 -0.035 0.236 0.088 -0.075 0.134 -0.140 -0.115 -0.163 -0.158 -0.115 -0.134 -0.134 -0.092
(0.001) (0.515) (0.282) (0.096) (0.020) (0.161) (0.360) (0.482) (0.699) (0.189) (0.703) (0.009) (0.335) (0.415) (0.143) (0.125) (0.211) (0.073) (0.084) (0.211) (0.142) (0.142) (0.314)
YO_7 -0.032 -0.135 -0.068 0.001 -0.045 0.050 -0.059 -0.045 0.099 -0.132 0.258 -0.065 -0.045 0.124 -0.037 -0.098 -0.080 -0.115 -0.111 -0.115 -0.094 -0.094 -0.065
(0.728) (0.141) (0.456) (0.991) (0.626) (0.585) (0.521) (0.623) (0.278) (0.148) (0.004) (0.480) (0.623) (0.176) (0.689) (0.283) (0.381) (0.211) (0.227) (0.211) (0.305) (0.305) (0.480)
YO_8 -0.054 0.111 0.359 0.059 -0.064 -0.005 -0.069 0.303 0.070 -0.116 0.202 -0.076 -0.053 -0.061 -0.043 -0.115 -0.094 -0.134 -0.130 -0.134 -0.094 -0.110 -0.076
(0.556) (0.225) (0.000) (0.519) (0.484) (0.959) (0.453) (0.001) (0.445) (0.207) (0.027) (0.409) (0.564) (0.504) (0.639) (0.209) (0.305) (0.142) (0.157) (0.142) (0.305) (0.229) (0.409)
YO_9 -0.094 -0.003 0.129 0.119 -0.045 0.059 -0.069 -0.053 0.070 -0.057 -0.100 -0.076 -0.053 0.403 -0.043 -0.115 -0.094 -0.134 -0.130 -0.134 -0.094 -0.110 -0.076
(0.305) (0.977) (0.159) (0.194) (0.626) (0.523) (0.453) (0.564) (0.445) (0.536) (0.277) (0.409) (0.564) (0.000) (0.639) (0.209) (0.305) (0.142) (0.157) (0.142) (0.305) (0.229) (0.409)
YO_10 -0.081 -0.078 -0.008 -0.101 -0.012 -0.047 -0.047 -0.036 -0.047 -0.080 0.070 -0.052 0.208 -0.042 -0.030 -0.079 -0.065 -0.092 -0.089 -0.092 -0.065 -0.076 -0.076
(0.378) (0.398) (0.928) (0.272) (0.893) (0.610) (0.606) (0.692) (0.606) (0.386) (0.447) (0.570) (0.022) (0.646) (0.747) (0.388) (0.480) (0.314) (0.331) (0.314) (0.480) (0.409) (0.409)
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APPENDIX 5 
 
This table presents the correlation coefficients between the dependent variable and the independent variables for the 
public companies acquired. PNA is the transaction price divided by net assets of the particular company, 1/NA is a 
reciprocal of net assets, SNA is sales divided by net assets, EBITDANA is EBITDA divided by net assets, and NDNA is 
net debt divided by net assets. IND_1-11 are indicator variables for the industry (see Appendix 2A). YO_1-10 are 
indicator variables for the acquisition year (see Appendix 2B). Pearson correlation coefficients are presented below the 
diagonal and the Spearman rank correlation coefficients are above the diagonal. Correlation coefficients with 
significance level of 5% (0.05) and greater are bolded. P-values are reported in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
  
PNA 1/NA SNA EBITD
ANA
NDNA IND_2 IND_3 IND_4 IND_5 IND_6 IND_7 IND_8 IND_9 IND_ 
10
IND_ 
11
YO_2 YO_3 YO_4 YO_5 YO_6 YO_7 YO_8 YO_9 YO_10
PNA 0.171 0.288 0.012 -0.093 -0.041 0.067 -0.183 0.158 0.045 0.042 0.069 -0.096 0.046 0.019 0.137 -0.062 -0.280 0.068 0.134 0.009 0.088 0.029 -0.179
(0.060) (0.001) (0.900) (0.309) (0.658) (0.468) (0.045) (0.083) (0.622) (0.647) (0.454) (0.296) (0.614) (0.840) (0.135) (0.498) (0.002) (0.458) (0.143) (0.926) (0.337) (0.753) (0.050)
1/NA 0.318 0.581 -0.258 -0.012 -0.196 -0.139 0.088 0.065 0.165 -0.037 0.102 0.095 0.091 0.135 -0.106 -0.016 0.051 -0.056 0.007 -0.055 0.209 0.032 0.036
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.895) (0.031) (0.128) (0.340) (0.476) (0.070) (0.684) (0.264) (0.299) (0.319) (0.141) (0.247) (0.861) (0.576) (0.543) (0.941) (0.549) (0.021) (0.727) (0.698)
SNA 0.414 0.331 0.027 0.069 -0.155 0.109 0.075 0.109 0.066 0.070 0.046 0.087 -0.020 0.132 0.110 -0.038 0.015 -0.019 -0.064 -0.200 0.229 -0.017 -0.099
(0.000) (0.000) (0.770) (0.455) (0.090) (0.232) (0.416) (0.232) (0.469) (0.448) (0.618) (0.344) (0.829) (0.150) (0.230) (0.676) (0.871) (0.836) (0.483) (0.028) (0.012) (0.852) (0.279)
EBITDA
NA
0.155 -0.378 0.021 0.218 0.030 0.068 -0.120 0.178 -0.258 0.000 -0.161 0.119 0.017 -0.052 0.065 0.054 -0.055 -0.121 -0.156 -0.163 0.053 0.115 0.216
(0.090) (0.000) (0.817) (0.016) (0.741) (0.460) (0.189) (0.050) (0.004) (1.000) (0.077) (0.195) (0.851) (0.571) (0.477) (0.558) (0.548) (0.186) (0.087) (0.074) (0.566) (0.211) (0.017)
NDNA -0.115 -0.175 -0.162 0.153 -0.007 0.064 0.003 0.163 -0.450 0.010 0.060 0.091 0.201 -0.007 -0.193 -0.073 -0.121 0.194 -0.059 -0.037 0.147 0.119 0.194
(0.210) (0.054) (0.076) (0.093) (0.944) (0.484) (0.974) (0.074) (0.000) (0.911) (0.514) (0.319) (0.027) (0.936) (0.034) (0.424) (0.188) (0.033) (0.524) (0.687) (0.109) (0.194) (0.033)
IND_2 -0.119 -0.193 -0.143 0.064 -0.022 -0.122 -0.094 -0.122 -0.412 -0.176 -0.134 -0.094 -0.109 -0.076 0.030 0.218 -0.074 -0.131 -0.045 0.030 -0.054 -0.022 0.050
(0.192) (0.034) (0.119) (0.484) (0.814) (0.183) (0.307) (0.183) (0.000) (0.053) (0.143) (0.307) (0.236) (0.407) (0.743) (0.016) (0.421) (0.151) (0.623) (0.743) (0.557) (0.810) (0.585)
IND_3 -0.039 -0.065 0.020 0.071 0.064 -0.122 -0.033 -0.043 -0.146 -0.062 -0.047 -0.033 -0.038 -0.027 0.088 -0.081 -0.084 -0.069 0.139 -0.062 -0.066 -0.059 -0.059
(0.674) (0.476) (0.831) (0.438) (0.485) (0.183) (0.719) (0.639) (0.110) (0.497) (0.606) (0.719) (0.676) (0.770) (0.335) (0.377) (0.360) (0.453) (0.129) (0.497) (0.474) (0.521) (0.521)
IND_4 -0.064 0.100 -0.023 -0.039 -0.008 -0.094 -0.033 -0.033 -0.112 -0.048 -0.036 -0.025 -0.029 -0.021 -0.048 -0.062 0.088 -0.053 -0.069 -0.048 0.319 -0.045 -0.045
(0.487) (0.276) (0.804) (0.669) (0.927) (0.307) (0.719) (0.719) (0.221) (0.602) (0.692) (0.782) (0.748) (0.822) (0.602) (0.498) (0.335) (0.564) (0.453) (0.602) (0.000) (0.623) (0.623)
IND_5 0.104 0.012 0.125 0.208 0.329 -0.122 -0.043 -0.033 -0.146 -0.062 -0.047 -0.033 -0.038 -0.027 0.088 -0.081 -0.084 0.070 -0.090 0.088 0.079 0.099 -0.059
(0.257) (0.898) (0.172) (0.022) (0.000) (0.183) (0.639) (0.719) (0.110) (0.497) (0.606) (0.719) (0.676) (0.770) (0.335) (0.377) (0.360) (0.445) (0.328) (0.335) (0.390) (0.278) (0.521)
IND_6 0.062 0.173 0.059 -0.268 -0.288 -0.412 -0.146 -0.112 -0.146 -0.211 -0.161 -0.112 -0.130 -0.091 0.108 0.037 0.171 -0.057 0.083 -0.083 -0.100 0.002 -0.132
(0.502) (0.058) (0.521) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.110) (0.221) (0.110) (0.020) (0.079) (0.221) (0.156) (0.320) (0.238) (0.688) (0.061) (0.536) (0.365) (0.364) (0.275) (0.986) (0.148)
IND_7 -0.059 -0.090 0.169 0.025 0.020 -0.176 -0.062 -0.048 -0.062 -0.211 -0.069 -0.048 -0.056 -0.039 -0.090 -0.117 -0.035 0.001 -0.130 0.237 0.218 -0.085 0.029
(0.519) (0.325) (0.064) (0.785) (0.831) (0.053) (0.497) (0.602) (0.497) (0.020) (0.455) (0.602) (0.545) (0.672) (0.326) (0.201) (0.703) (0.993) (0.157) (0.009) (0.016) (0.354) (0.750)
IND_8 0.139 0.065 -0.016 -0.034 0.052 -0.134 -0.047 -0.036 -0.047 -0.161 -0.069 -0.036 -0.042 -0.030 -0.069 -0.089 0.017 0.179 0.111 -0.069 -0.072 -0.065 -0.065
(0.129) (0.478) (0.865) (0.711) (0.570) (0.143) (0.606) (0.692) (0.606) (0.079) (0.455) (0.692) (0.646) (0.747) (0.455) (0.331) (0.851) (0.050) (0.227) (0.455) (0.431) (0.480) (0.480)
IND_9 -0.054 0.194 0.010 0.054 0.039 -0.094 -0.033 -0.025 -0.033 -0.112 -0.048 -0.036 -0.029 -0.021 -0.048 0.095 -0.064 -0.053 0.077 -0.048 -0.050 -0.045 0.157
(0.554) (0.033) (0.917) (0.558) (0.673) (0.307) (0.719) (0.782) (0.719) (0.221) (0.602) (0.692) (0.748) (0.822) (0.602) (0.302) (0.482) (0.564) (0.400) (0.602) (0.583) (0.623) (0.085)
IND_10 -0.050 0.024 -0.036 0.021 0.134 -0.109 -0.038 -0.029 -0.038 -0.130 -0.056 -0.042 -0.029 -0.024 -0.056 -0.072 -0.075 -0.061 -0.080 0.112 -0.058 0.300 0.124
(0.587) (0.792) (0.696) (0.819) (0.144) (0.236) (0.676) (0.748) (0.676) (0.156) (0.545) (0.646) (0.748) (0.794) (0.545) (0.431) (0.415) (0.504) (0.384) (0.220) (0.524) (0.001) (0.176)
IND_11 -0.028 0.087 0.010 0.009 -0.010 -0.076 -0.027 -0.021 -0.027 -0.091 -0.039 -0.030 -0.021 -0.024 -0.039 -0.051 -0.052 -0.043 0.122 -0.039 -0.041 -0.037 -0.037
(0.764) (0.341) (0.917) (0.924) (0.916) (0.407) (0.770) (0.822) (0.770) (0.320) (0.672) (0.747) (0.822) (0.794) (0.672) (0.582) (0.568) (0.639) (0.182) (0.672) (0.655) (0.689) (0.689)
YO_2 -0.014 0.023 -0.006 0.066 -0.038 0.030 0.088 -0.048 0.088 0.108 -0.090 -0.069 -0.048 -0.056 -0.039 -0.117 -0.121 -0.100 -0.130 -0.090 -0.095 -0.085 -0.085
(0.875) (0.803) (0.951) (0.475) (0.680) (0.743) (0.335) (0.602) (0.335) (0.238) (0.326) (0.455) (0.602) (0.545) (0.672) (0.201) (0.185) (0.277) (0.157) (0.326) (0.300) (0.354) (0.354)
YO_3 -0.106 -0.063 -0.080 0.060 -0.027 0.218 -0.081 -0.062 -0.081 0.037 -0.117 -0.089 0.095 -0.072 -0.051 -0.117 -0.158 -0.130 -0.168 -0.117 -0.123 -0.111 -0.111
(0.249) (0.489) (0.382) (0.512) (0.772) (0.016) (0.377) (0.498) (0.377) (0.688) (0.201) (0.331) (0.302) (0.431) (0.582) (0.201) (0.084) (0.157) (0.065) (0.201) (0.177) (0.227) (0.227)
YO_4 -0.025 0.107 0.140 -0.136 -0.225 -0.074 -0.084 0.088 -0.084 0.171 -0.035 0.017 -0.064 -0.075 -0.052 -0.121 -0.158 -0.134 -0.175 -0.121 -0.128 -0.115 -0.115
(0.786) (0.243) (0.126) (0.137) (0.013) (0.421) (0.360) (0.335) (0.360) (0.061) (0.703) (0.851) (0.482) (0.415) (0.568) (0.185) (0.084) (0.142) (0.056) (0.185) (0.162) (0.211) (0.211)
YO_5 -0.057 -0.105 -0.080 -0.042 0.041 -0.131 -0.069 -0.053 0.070 -0.057 0.001 0.179 -0.053 -0.061 -0.043 -0.100 -0.130 -0.134 -0.143 -0.100 -0.105 -0.094 -0.094
(0.535) (0.253) (0.385) (0.651) (0.658) (0.151) (0.453) (0.564) (0.445) (0.536) (0.993) (0.050) (0.564) (0.504) (0.639) (0.277) (0.157) (0.142) (0.117) (0.277) (0.252) (0.305) (0.305)
YO_6 0.180 0.133 -0.061 -0.017 -0.005 -0.045 0.139 -0.069 -0.090 0.083 -0.130 0.111 0.077 -0.080 0.122 -0.130 -0.168 -0.175 -0.143 -0.130 -0.136 -0.122 -0.122
(0.049) (0.145) (0.505) (0.855) (0.959) (0.623) (0.129) (0.453) (0.328) (0.365) (0.157) (0.227) (0.400) (0.384) (0.182) (0.157) (0.065) (0.056) (0.117) (0.157) (0.136) (0.181) (0.181)
YO_7 -0.043 -0.113 -0.089 -0.011 -0.024 0.030 -0.062 -0.048 0.088 -0.083 0.237 -0.069 -0.048 0.112 -0.039 -0.090 -0.117 -0.121 -0.100 -0.130 -0.095 -0.085 -0.085
(0.637) (0.216) (0.334) (0.909) (0.792) (0.743) (0.497) (0.602) (0.335) (0.364) (0.009) (0.455) (0.602) (0.220) (0.672) (0.326) (0.201) (0.185) (0.277) (0.157) (0.300) (0.354) (0.354)
YO_8 0.126 0.139 0.184 -0.168 0.061 -0.054 -0.066 0.319 0.079 -0.100 0.218 -0.072 -0.050 -0.058 -0.041 -0.095 -0.123 -0.128 -0.105 -0.136 -0.095 -0.090 -0.090
(0.167) (0.128) (0.044) (0.066) (0.507) (0.557) (0.474) (0.000) (0.390) (0.275) (0.016) (0.431) (0.583) (0.524) (0.655) (0.300) (0.177) (0.162) (0.252) (0.136) (0.300) (0.328) (0.328)
YO_9 0.029 -0.016 0.044 0.147 0.264 -0.022 -0.059 -0.045 0.099 0.002 -0.085 -0.065 -0.045 0.300 -0.037 -0.085 -0.111 -0.115 -0.094 -0.122 -0.085 -0.090 -0.080
(0.749) (0.861) (0.632) (0.107) (0.004) (0.810) (0.521) (0.623) (0.278) (0.986) (0.354) (0.480) (0.623) (0.001) (0.689) (0.354) (0.227) (0.211) (0.305) (0.181) (0.354) (0.328) (0.381)
YO_10 -0.100 -0.065 -0.058 0.087 0.047 0.050 -0.059 -0.045 -0.059 -0.132 0.029 -0.065 0.157 0.124 -0.037 -0.085 -0.111 -0.115 -0.094 -0.122 -0.085 -0.090 -0.080
(0.274) (0.481) (0.528) (0.344) (0.605) (0.585) (0.521) (0.623) (0.521) (0.148) (0.750) (0.480) (0.085) (0.176) (0.689) (0.354) (0.227) (0.211) (0.305) (0.181) (0.354) (0.328) (0.381)
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APPENDIX 6 
RESULTS FROM MULTIPLES VALUATION ANALYSIS 
 
This table presents the results yield from this research and two previous researches. In this thesis the valuation multiples 
differ, as the numerator is transaction price instead of enterprise value. Enterprise value is defined by multiplying the 
shares outstanding by the market value and then by adding convertible securities, short-term debt, straight debt, 
preferred equity minus cash and marketable securities (Koeplin, Sarin et al., 2000). The sample in Block’s study (2007) 
consists of 182 acquisitions or 91 acquisition pairs, where Koeplin, Sarin et al. (2000) research gathered 84 acquisition 
pairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price-to-Net assets
Price-to-Sales
Price-to-EBIT *
Price-to-EBITDA **
Ent.Val-to-Book value
Ent.Val-to-Sales
Ent.Val-to-EBIT
Ent.Val-to-EBITDA
* 53 private companies and 73 public companies excluded due to negative EBIT.
** 40 private companies and 65 public companies excluded due to negative EBITDA.
n.a. n.a. 24.56% 22.49% 20.39% 18.14%
n.a. n.a. 27.10% 24.29% 28.26% 30.62%
n.a. n.a. 26.35% 24.49% -2.28% 0.79%
n.a. n.a. 16.25% 14.47% 17.81% -7.00%
28.70% 17.21% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
13.22% 22.63% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
17.30% -50.46% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
15.20% -35.06% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Thesis Block Koeplin, Sarin et al.
